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Abstract 
The Peterborough Prison Bond is a social impact bond (SIB) that was issued by the UK 
government to reduce recidivism rate in the Peterborough prison. Most of the literature on 
the SIB so far has been focused on the opportunities, challenges, and the related policy issues 
(see (Fox), (Strickland), and (Disley)), and little effort has been made to provide a 
mathematical framework to determine a fair price for such instruments. Here, we aim to 
provide a pricing framework for the bond. We price the bond both from the issuer's and the 
buyer's perspective, by adjusting for the bond's risk, ambiguity, and social impact. Results 
suggest that the issuer could maximize its financial profit by targeting investors with a lower 
aversion to charity, and it could maximize the bond’s social impact by targeting the investors 
with lower aversion to risk. 
Keywords 
Social Impact Bonds, Peterborough Prison Bond, Most Likely Parameter Estimation, 
Bayesian Statistics, Ambiguity Aversion, Wang Transform, Robust Indifference Pricing, 
Social Utility.  
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Chapter 1  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Social Impact Bonds are multi-stakeholder partnerships between private, philanthropic, 
non-profit, and public sectors. Private and philanthropic investors pay for preventive 
interventions that are carried out by non-profit service providers. If certain social 
outcomes are achieved, government saves money on its future expenditures, and a part of 
these savings is paid to the SIB investors. As a result, investors earn a blended social and 
financial return that is uncorrelated with the financial market; government reduces its risk 
of spending tax-payers money on unsuccessful projects; service providers get the needed 
cash upfront; and the society at large benefits as overall quality of life improves.  
The first SIB was issued in the UK to reduce reconviction rate in the Peterborough 
Prison. Since then, SIBs have gained popularity and currently work is underway on 
several bonds in the UK1, Canada2, Australia3, and the US4. This rapid increase in the 
number of SIBs is a clear indication of their appeal to all the stakeholders. In detailed 
interviews with 22 individuals5 from organizations involved in the development and 
implementation of the Peterborough Prison SIB, almost all stakeholders expressed 
positive sentiments about the project.  
                                                 
1
 http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/work/sibs 
2
 http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/11/09/kelly-mcparland-ottawa-explores-social-impact-bonds-
to-finance-services-at-a-profit/ 
3
 http://www.afr.com/p/national/westpac_cba_embrace_social_bonds_myi01zs3Mzr2EVCbfTJrkM 
4
 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/11/05/43834/new-york-city-and-
massachusetts-to-launch-the-first-social-impact-bond-programs-in-the-united-states/ 
5
 http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/social-impact-bond-hmp-peterborough%5B1%5D.pdf 
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Despite their growing popularity, most of the literature on SIBs has been focused on the 
identification of suitable intervention areas (Fox), development guidelines for the SIB 
(Finance, Social), and potential benefits to public sectors, but no effort has been made to 
provide a mathematical framework to value such derivatives. However, in order for SIBs 
to become publicly traded securities, a rigorous pricing framework that allows investors 
to gauge the risk and return characteristics of the investment, is necessary. Here we make 
an effort to provide such a mechanism.  
We first obtain a probability distribution for the outcome of Peterborough prison rehab 
program by analyzing the performance of past rehab programs from around the world. A 
weighting mechanism is used to take into account the differences between the rehab 
programs. This distribution then lays the foundation for a discounted cash flow valuation 
of the bond. Two valuation mechanisms are presented here. One mechanism uses the 
Wang Transform, and the other uses the Max-Min Expected utility theory. Both 
mechanisms adjust for both the risk associated with the bond’s cash flows and the 
ambiguity associated with the model for the underlying reconviction rate. The 
Peterborough SIB, in addition to a financial return, also provides a social return by 
offering investors an opportunity to invest in a socially beneficial project. This social 
return is what enticed many charitable institutions, and socially responsible investors to 
invest in the bond, and it is important include its effect in determining the fair price of the 
bond. Therefore, the effect of the social impact of the bond on the utility of a socially 
responsible investor – one who would be willing to trade off financial return for the 
social impact – is also considered, and its effect on fair price of the bond is analyzed.  
To provide a complete picture, we also price the bond from the issuer’s perspective 
taking into account the issuer’s risk adjusted price for the net bond payout (bond payout 
to buyers less the issuer’s savings from the drop in recidivism rate), and the issuer’s 
willingness for welfare spending. We compare the buyer’s price with the issuer’s price to 
obtain a set of values for the bond’s notional and cap rate that can lead to voluntary 
transaction between the buyer and the seller. We also find the optimal values for the 
bond’s notional and cap rate that maximize the issuer’s profit for a given set of risk and 
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welfare preferences. In the end, we show how the issuer could benefit from the price 
information obtained from the first bond to optimize its profit for such bonds in future.  
The main conclusions of this work are 
• The lack of quantitative data available for the prison rehabilitation programs makes the 
ambiguity in the model a major source of uncertainty. 
• The skew normal distribution provides a better fit for the reconviction rate data as 
compared to the beta distribution. 
• For a given level of risk aversion and pricing mechanism, the beta distribution yields 
lower price than the price under the skew normal distribution. 
• The fair price calculated using the Wang transform is more sensitive to the level of risk 
aversion and interest rates, as compared to the price calculated using utility mechanism. 
• The effect of the ambiguity adjustment can be seen as a trade-off between discount for 
the risk of the bond and the discount for the ambiguity in the model used for the 
recidivism rate. 
• For a given risk adjusted price and a given level of faith in the reference model used for 
the recidivism rate, the Wang transform yields a lower ambiguity adjusted price than 
the ambiguity adjusted price under utility mechanism.  
• For a socially responsible investor, the bond price can either increase or decrease with 
the investor’s risk aversion, depending on the investor’s risk and charity preferences. 
• A socially responsible investor can find a unique value for the risk aversion parameter 
that minimizes the investor’s price, for a given aversion to charity.  
• In the absence of any budget constraints, the issuer maximizes its expected profit by 
funding the rehabilitation program with its money, without issuing the bond. 
• In the presence of budgetary constraints, the issuer can identify a region for the bond’s 
notional and cap rate where the issuer can earn a profit by issuing the bond. 
• The issuer should choose small values for the bond’s notional and cap rate to target 
investors with lower aversion to charity, and the issuer should choose higher notional 
and smaller cap rate to target investors with relatively low financial aversion to risk.  
• Issuer can increase the combined financial and social impact of the bond, by increasing 
either the social impact or the financial impact, but not both.  
• The issuer should spend very little on welfare to maximize the social impact of the bond, 
and it should increase its welfare spending to maximize its financial profit.   
1.1.  Peterborough Prison Social Impact Bond (Disley) 
Although the valuation framework can be easily generalized to some of the other SIBs 
being implemented around the world, we focus on the Peterborough Prison Bond. This is 
the world’s first SIB issued by the UK government in 2010 to reduce recidivism rate of 
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the young male prisoners between the ages of 18 to 30, serving a short term sentence of 
12 month or less in the Peterborough Prison. According to the estimates of the 
government of the UK, 60,000 adults per year receive sentences of 12 months or less. 
This makes up 10% of adult prison population. Short term prisoners make up 65% of all 
admissions and releases, and they have on average 16 previous convictions. According to 
the Social Exclusion Unit every re-offender costs the state a minimum of £143,000, and 
the usual reconviction rate for such offenders is 75% (Strickland).  
In September 2010, the UK Ministry of Justice entered into a SIB mechanism for funding 
interventions for offenders at Peterborough Prison. Social Finance is acting as a financial 
intermediary, and the rehabilitation services will be provided by St. Giles Trust, a non-
profit organization.  Social Finance raised £5 million of investment funding from private 
individuals and charities, and the outcome payments will be made by the Ministry of 
Justice and the Big Lottery Fund if the reconviction rate drops by at least 10% for each 
cohort, or 7.5% overall. It is important to note that the Peterborough Prison Bond is not a 
fixed income instrument, unlike what the name may suggest. It pays absolutely nothing if 
the reconviction rate doesn't decrease by at least 10% in any one of the cohorts or by 
7.5% across all cohorts. Hence, in terms of its payout it is more like call option. 
Independent assessors from QinetiQ and the University of Leicester will determine the 
reconviction rate for prisoners who received interventions under the SIB. The offenders 
in each cohort will be compared to matched control groups. Each control group will be 
drawn from all prisoners released from sentences of less than 12 months, within the same 
time period from other prisons nationally. One-to-many propensity score-matching will 
be used to select the control group. This means that each cohort prisoner will be matched 
to up to 10 control group prisoners. According to an interviewee from the Ministry of 
Justice, the strength of using propensity score-matching (PSM) as an approach to 
building the control group is that it allows the assessor to control for different 
characteristics of the offenders.  
The Peterborough SIB is a seven year project, and three cohorts of 1000 prisoners each 
will receive the rehabilitation services under this program. According to the Peterborough 
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prison statistics, it will take about two years to recruit a cohort of 1000 offenders. Each 
cohort will last until 1000 program participants have been released or two years have 
completed, whichever is earlier. Reconviction rate for each cohort is defined as the 
percentage of prisoners that are convicted for a crime in the first year after their release, 
and we will be using the terms reconviction rate and recidivism rate interchangeably. 
Measurement of the reconviction rate will include all prisoners released from the 
Peterborough Prison during this period, and will not be restricted to the prisoners that 
actually received the rehabilitation services in the SIB. This procedure is chosen to 
reduce service provider's incentive to cherry-pick those prisoners that are less likely to 
get reconvicted. Reconvictions will be measured over a period of one year. Hence, one 
year will be required to determine the reconviction rate after 1000 prisoners are released 
from the prison. So the first payment will be made about three years after the recruitment 
of first cohort i.e. in fall of 2013. While second and third payments, linked to the 
reconviction rate of the second and third cohorts, respectively, will be made 
approximately five and seven years after the launch of the project i.e. in 2015 and 2017 
respectively.  
For the ease of discussion, we will break down the payments into three smaller coupon 
payments made during 3rd, 5th, and 7th year of the program and a larger fourth coupon 
payment that would be made in the 7th year if none of the first three coupon payments are 
made. Each one of the first three coupons make a payment if the reconviction rate of the 
SIB cohort decreases by at least 10%, which is the minimum value for the drop in 
reconviction rate to be considered statistically significant for a cohort of thousand 
prisoners, compared to a similar matched group of prisoners. However, if none of the 
cohorts show a drop of at least 10%, all of the cohorts (3000 offenders) will be examined 
together at the end of the entire rehabilitation program, and if the average reconviction 
rate drops by at least 7.5%, a payout will be made. In order to cap the total cost to the 
government, payouts are capped from above, and investors’ payout do not increase after 
recidivism rate exceeds a certain limit. 
Mathematically, these coupon payments can be expressed as 
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+,-.,, 0, .12 3 0 4 .,1000 7-10% 8 ., 8 .12  0 4 .1 1000 7- ., 9.12  0 7-., : 10%2, (1.1) 
+;-.;, 0, .12 3 0 4 .;1000 7-10% 8 .; 8 .12  0 4 .1 1000 7- .; 9 .12 0 7-.; : 10%2, (1.2) 
+<-.<, 0, .12 3 0 4 .<1000 7-10% 8 .< 8 .12  0 4 .1 1000 7- .< 9 .12 0 7-.< : 10%2, (1.3) 
+=-.,, .;, .<, 0, .123 0 4 . 3000 7-., : 10%, .; : 10%, .< : 10%,7.5% 8 . 8 .12 0 4 .1 3000 7-., : 10%, .; : 10%, .< : 10%,. 9 .12  0 7-. : 7.5%2. (1.4) 
Here, k is the notional amount paid per unit decrease in reconviction rate, N is the number 
of bonds held by the investor, .,, .;, .< are the differences in reconviction rate between 
control group and the first, second and third cohorts respectively, .1 is the drop in 
reconviction rate after which payout remains fixed, . is the average drop in reconviction 
rate in all three cohorts, and 7-. 2 is the indicator function.  
The present value of the bond’s total payout can be written as 
A-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02 CDEFG+1-.1, 0, .02  CDEFH+2-.1, 0, .02  CDEFI+<-.3, 0, .02 CDEFI+=-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02, (1.5) 
where J,, J;, J< are the times for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd payouts, and K is the risk free rate. 
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At this point, it is important to note that the Peterborough Bond is not free from 
shortcoming. The reconviction rate as defined for the Peterborough Bond creates some 
misplaced incentives. As described earlier, only the reconvictions that take place in the 
first year are included in the reconviction rate. This may incentivize the service provider 
to focus on prisoners' short term behavior and crimes that can get reconvictions from the 
courts quickly, and ignore the prisoners' long term behavior and crimes that may take 
longer to get reconvictions. Hence, the program may succeed in reducing the reconviction 
rate in the short term but may not change the prisoners' long term behavior. In addition, 
the Peterborough project may face internal frictions from different organs of the 
government. A privately funded prison rehab program that reduces the reconviction rate 
significantly may reduce for the regular prison staff, and hence may encounter friction. In 
addition, if investors are allowed to short the bond, then they would have an incentive to 
work against a drop in the reconviction rate, and may actually try to influence the 
outcome of the program.   
1.2. Reference Parameters 
Here, we present the default values for the parameters present in the bond payout 
function. For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate K is the same for all payouts. 
Default values are given below: 
LMM
N
MMO
0  0.01£K  3%.0  13%J,  3 PCQKJ;  5 PCQKJ<  7 PCQK4  1.
R (1.6) 
The value of notional per bond per prisoner (0) is chosen such that each bondholder 
receives a coupon payment of 1£ if the reconviction rate drops by 10%. The actual 
notional amount paid by the issuer of the bond can be different from it. However, any 
such difference will not affect our analyses because the number of bonds held by an 
investor can be adjusted to accommodate the difference. For example, If the actual value 
of  0 is 1£, then in our framework the investor will hold 100 bonds.   
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1.3. Yield to Maturity 
The yield to maturity or the internal rate of return for this bond is the discount rate that 
makes the present value of all the future cash payments equal to the price paid for the 
bond. This can be easily computed, assuming the price paid for one bond is S, as the T 
that satisfies (1.7), 
CDUFG+1-.1, 0, .02  CDUFH+2-.1, 0, .02  CDUFI+<-.3, 0, .02 CDUFI+=-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02  S  0. (1.7) 
Assuming recidivism among all three cohorts is decreased by the same amount so that .,, .;, .< are the same, yield to maturity for different notional amounts and prices paid is 
shown below, for .1  13%. 
  
Figure 1: The left panel shows the yield to maturity for different notional amounts, 
and the right panel shows the yield to maturity for different prices. Both plots 
assume that the reconviction rate drop by same percentage among all cohorts. 
If change in recidivism (.) is smaller than 7.5%, yield to maturity is undefined as 
investors don’t get any payout.  For 7.5% 8 . : 10%, yield to maturity increases 
linearly as the payout for the 4th coupon increases linearly with .. At .  10%, payout 
for the 4th coupon becomes zero, but the payout for the first three coupons become non-
zero. Since the payments for the first three coupons has the same notional amount as the 
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4th coupon but happens sooner,  so the bond’s yield takes a sudden jump, and then 
increases linearly for 10% 8 . : 13%, as the payout for the three coupons increases 
linearly. After . exceeds .1  13%, yield stays constant as the payout doesn’t increase 
with increasing .. Moreover, yield to maturity curve is shifted upward by increasing 0 as 
it increases the notional amount of the bond, which in turn increases every payout by an 
equal amount. Similarly, increasing S shifts the curves downward 
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Chapter 2  
2. Modeling the Underlying Reconviction Rate  
As discussed earlier, the bond’s payout is linked to the outcome of the rehab program, so 
we need a probability distribution for the reconviction rate of Peterborough Prison 
cohorts relative to the control group. This distribution is obtained using the results of past 
rehab programs from around the world. However, different rehab programs can be of 
very different natures, so we need a mechanism to adjust for these differences. Notably, 
the Peterborough prison rehab program is an integrated program that provides rehab 
services according to the needs of prisoners, while most of the past programs have been 
focused on one specific need. To adjust for the differences in programs, we calculate an 
overlap between the historical programs and the program implemented at Peterborough 
prison.   
Since the Peterborough Prison rehab program provides services according to the needs of 
the prisoners, we cannot exactly determine its nature. However, the service provider for 
the Peterborough rehab program, St. Giles Trust, carried out a similar Through the Gates 
(TtG) program in 2009. The Peterborough program is likely to include similar rehab 
services that were provided in the TtG program. So we use the TtG program as a proxy 
for the Peterborough rehab program.  
The overlap between the past programs and the TtG rehab program is then determined as 
the percentage of prisoners that received the same services in TtG program that were 
provided by the compared rehab program (see Appendix 1 for data). Hence, a weight is 
assigned to each program as determined by its overlap with TtG program. For example, 
approximately 12% offenders in TtG program received education and employment 
related services, so the rehab programs that focused exclusively on providing education 
and employment related services get a weight of 12%. For integrated programs that 
provide more than one service, a weight is calculated for each service area and then total 
weight is calculated by adding weights for all services provided. Weight for each bin is 
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calculated as the average weight for all programs that lie in that bin. These weights are 
then used to plot a weighted histogram.  
However, the weights calculated here are only for illustration purposes, and a more 
detailed analysis of offenders’ demographics, past convictions, and severity of past 
crimes should be considered to determine more accurate weights for the rehab programs. 
Nevertheless, the method here provides enough flexibility to take into account differences 
between different rehab programs. 
Weighted histogram for the choice of bins and weights shown in Appendix 1 is given 
below.  
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Reconviction Rate data. Negative (positive) values of the 
reconviction rate correspond to an increase (decrease) in the reconviction rate.   
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2.1. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the outcomes of past rehab programs are shown in the table below.  
Moments 
Central Non-central 
Raw Weighted Raw Weighted 
First 0.0969  0.0849 0.0969 0.0849 
Second 0.01028 0.01159 0.01967 0.01880 
Third 1.98 2.045 0.00596 0.00612 
Fourth 8.55 7.844 0.00237 0.00248 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the raw data sets. 
Raw and weighted moments differ by the choice of weights used in calculating moments. 
Raw moments assume that all rehab programs get identical weights, while the weighted 
moments use the weights specified in Appendix-1. It is clear from the table that the 
choice of weights makes a negligible difference on the values of moments. 
2.2. Fitting Probability Distribution to Reconviction Data 
After obtaining the histogram, we proceed to fit a probability distribution to this 
histogram. Since the difference between the reconviction rates of the Peterborough prison 
cohort and the control group has to lie between -100% and 100%, the beta distribution on 
the interval -1 to +1 is a natural choice. For the purposes of comparison, we also use the 
skew-normal distribution. Compared to the beta distribution, skew-normal distribution 
has one additional parameter, and hence provides more flexibility in fitting distribution to 
the raw data (as will be described in later sections).  
The probability density function for the skew normal distribution is 
13 
 
VW1XY-Z, [, \, ]2  2] ^ _Z  \] ` a _[ Z  \] `, (2.1) 
where [ is the skewness, \ is the mean, ] is the scale parameter of skew-normal 
distribution, and ^-. 2 and a-. 2 are the standard normal probability and cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively. The density function for the beta distribution is 
VbXcd-Z, , 2  -1  Z2eD,-1  Z2fD,2egfD,h-, 2 ,  (2.2) 
where Z i j1,1k, and h-, 2 is the Beta function, defined as 
h-, 2  l-Z2eD,-1  Z2fD,,m nZ. (2.3) 
After selecting the probability distributions, we move on to finding the right distribution 
parameters that fit distribution to the raw data. For the purposes of comparison, we 
choose two estimation methods: ) methods of moments, and ii) maximum likelihood. 
2.2.1. Method of Moments 
Appropriate skew-normal and beta distribution parameters can be determined using the 
method of moments. In the method of moments, we choose distribution parameters such 
that the moments of the fitted distribution match the sample moments (shown in Table 1).  
For the skew-normal distribution, mean, variance, and skewness can be written in terms 
of the distribution parameters, and these equations can then be inverted to estimate the 
distribution parameters from the sample means (see Appendix 2). However, these 
inverted equations can only be used if the sample skewness is less than 1. However, for 
our data, sample skewness is 1.09. Therefore, parameter estimates are calculated 
numerically by equating the first three sample moments with the distribution moments, 
without inverting those equations. This leads to 
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o [p  73.37\̂  0.0028]p  0.083, R (2.4) 
for the skew normal distribution. For the beta distribution, we write the first two moments 
in terms of the distribution parameters, and then numerically solve for the parameters that 
make the distribution moments equal to the sample moments. This leads to 
sp  45.92v  38.73.R (2.5) 
2.2.2. Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation 
Now we use the maximum likelihood principle to find the most likely parameters for 
skew normal and beta distributions. Most likely parameters are the ones that maximize 
the likelihood function for the observed dataset.  
The likelihood functions for the skew normal distribution is 
wW1XY-[, \, ]2 3 ∏ VW1XY-Zy2z-y2{y|, , (2.6) 
where VW1XY is the probability density function of the skew-normal distribution and V-}2 
is the weighted frequency for the }c~ bin (given in Table 1 of Appendix 1). Similarly the 
likelihood function for the beta distribution is  
wbXcd-, 2 3 ∏ VbXcd-Zy2z-y2{y|, , (2.7) 
where VbXcd is the probability density function of the beta distribution, and V-}2 is the 
weighted frequency for the }c~ bin.  
For convenience, we work with the log likelihood function, and calculate parameters that 
maximize the log likelihood function for the skew normal and the beta distributions 
(calculations are shown in the Appendix 3). For the skew normal distribution, this yields 
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o [    3.69\  0.002]  0.13 R. (2.8) 
Following the same procedure for beta distribution, we get  
s   60.25  50.02 R. (2.9) 
2.2.3. Comparison of Most Likely and Method of 
Moments Estimates 
Comparing the most likely estimates with the method of moment estimates, parameter 
estimates do exhibit some dependency on the choice of method. However, as we will see 
later, the fair price of the bond is not very sensitive to the variation of this magnitude in 
parameter values. Plots for the skew-normal and the beta distribution are shown below. 
  
Figure 3: Method of Moment and the Maximum Likelihood fits to the raw data for 
the skew normal (left panel) and the beta distribution (right panel). 
The most likely estimate appears to be a better fit for both the skew-normal and the beta 
distribution. So, from here onward, we will stick to the maximum likely parameter 
estimates only.  
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2.3.  Sensitivity Analysis for Distribution Parameters 
The parameters estimated so far have been obtained by fitting the distributions to the 
weighted histogram of the raw data. However, as described earlier, the weights used in 
the weighted histogram are mainly for illustration purposes, and may or may not be a 
good representation of the actual overlap between the rehab programs. Therefore, we first 
analyze the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to the weights used for the rehab 
programs, and then produce a dataset by averaging over a range of values for the weight 
of each rehab program. In addition to the weights, we also treat the bin widths as a 
variable, and instead of sticking to one choice of bin widths, we average over a range 
choices for bins. In fact, the parameter estimates are more sensitive to the choice of bins 
than to the weights due to the fewer number of rehab programs. Including results of more 
rehab programs could reduce the sensitivity to both the bin width and the program 
weight. 
To estimate the sensitivity of most likely parameters on the choice of bin widths and 
weights associated with the rehab programs, we let the weight of each type of rehab 
program vary from 5% to 95% in discrete steps of 30%, and choose four different sets of 
bins. Hence, we obtain 256 sets of weights, and 4 sets of bins. Then we calculate the 
maximum likelihood parameters for each one of the 256 sets of weights for four different 
choices of bins. This gives us a total of 1024 different sets of likelihood parameters. A 
more sophisticated Markov Chain Monte Carlo analysis that randomly selects weights 
and bin widths from a given set is also carried out, and yields results that are practically 
indistinguishable from the simpler analysis done by using fixed set of weights and bins. 
So we only present the results of the simplified analysis here.  
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Figure 4: A scatter plot of maximum likelihood parameters for the beta (left panel) 
and the skew normal (right panel) distributions. Color represents the value of log-
likelihood function for the given value of parameters, and it increases from blue to 
red ( ). Parameters for beta distribution are much less scattered 
than the skew normal distribution.  
Figure 5: Histograms for skewness (left panel), position (middle panel), and scale 
(right panel) of skew normal distribution.  
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Figure 6: Histograms for  (left panel) and  (right panel) parameters of the beta 
distribution. 
Figures 4 shows the maximum likelihood parameters for the skew normal (right panel) 
and beta (left panel) distributions the histograms for these parameters are shown in 
Figures 5 (skew normal) and 6 (beta). The skew-normal distribution parameters exhibit a 
much larger variation in the parameter estimates than the beta distribution parameters. 
This is mainly because the skew-normal distribution has three parameters, while the beta 
distribution has only two. An additional parameter in the skew-normal distribution 
provides more flexibility for the fitting the distribution, and hence leads to larger 
variability in parameter estimates. Therefore, the fair price calculated using the skew 
normal distribution shows much larger variation as compared to the fair price calculated 
using the beta distribution.   
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Figure 7: Price histograms for the skew-normal (left panel) and the beta (right 
panel) distributions. Price is calculated using indifference pricing mechanism 
described later. 
2.4.  Predictive Data Set 
Now we are in a position to generate a dataset, which is representative of a range of 
weights for each program and a range of choices for bins, by using the above calculated 
most likely parameters, and predicting a new data set using the Bayes principle, 
V-|2 3 l VVn  , (2.10) 
where   Z}|Z} i j1,1k represents the predictive data set,  is the observed data set, 
and  is the vector of distribution parameters, V-|2 is the joint probability density of 
 given dataset , and V is the probability density of observing dataset  given 
the distribution parameters vector .  
In short, we average over the bin widths and the program weights, and produce one 
representative dataset. The resulting predictive data sets for the beta and the skew normal 
distributions are shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Predictive probability density functions for the beta and the skew normal 
distribution. 
After getting the predictive data set, we find the most likely parameters for this data set. 
Resulting most likely distribution are plotted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Maximum likelihood distributions for predictive data set for the skew 
normal (left panel) and the beta (right panel) distributions.  
The maximum likely parameters for the skew normal distribution turn out to be 
o [    6.56\  0.01]  0.16 R , (2.11) 
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and the most likely parameters for the beta distribution are 
   66.00  55.34 R. (2.12) 
From now on we will use these parameters as the reference parameters, and all 
probabilities will be calculated using these parameters, unless otherwise specified. 
We now use the asymptotic normal approximation to get an estimate for the confidence 
intervals of the most likely parameters. In the asymptotic normal approximation, 
confidence interval for a parameter  is  
  ,.D-,2, (2.13) 
where -, Z2 is the second derivative of the log likelihood function with respect to  
evaluated at . Hence, the 95% confidence intervals for the skew normal distribution are 
 [: j1.356, 6.024k\: j0.036, 0.032k]: j0.117, 0.143k R , (2.14) 
Similarly, 95% confidence intervals for the beta distribution are 
s: j56.734, 63.767k: j47.104, 52.936kR. (2.15) 
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Figure 10: Comparison of the most likely distributions for raw and predicted data 
sets for the skew normal (left panel) and the beta (right panel) distributions. 
Figure 10 compares the maximum likelihood skew-normal and beta distributions for the 
predicted dataset with the maximum likely distribution for the raw dataset. It is clear 
from the figure that the skew-normal distribution exhibits a larger change than the beta 
distribution. This is because the skew-normal distribution has one additional parameter, 
and is more flexible than the beta distribution. However, the change is not very 
significant even for the skew normal distribution. This indicates that as long as the skew 
normal and the beta distributions are good fits for the rehab program data, our choice of 
reference bin widths and the program weights are a good representation of the raw data. 
Comparison of the summary statistics for the original data, and the most likely 
distributions is shown in table 2. It is clear from this comparison that the fitted 
distributions have much smaller kurtosis than the original data, and hence underestimate 
the probability of extreme outcomes. 
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Statistic Original Data Skew Normal  Beta 
Mean 9.69% 11.69%  8.78% 
Standard Deviation 10.14% 10.02%  9.01% 
Skewness 1.98 0.9071  -0.0316 
Kurtosis 8.55 3.767990  2.953235 
Table 2: Comparison of summary statistics. 95% confidence interval for the mean is 
[6.27%, 13.12%]. 
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Chapter 3  
3. Pricing Peterborough Prison SIB 
As described in section 1.1, the payout of the Peterborough Prison SIB is linked to the 
reconviction rate, which cannot be traded. Moreover, the bond is not publicly traded, so it 
is not possible to short the bond. Hence, the cash flows of the bond cannot be replicated. 
It is, therefore, an example of an incomplete market derivative that cannot be hedged, and 
Arbitrage Pricing theory cannot be used to determine a unique price for the bond. 
Therefore, we have to use incomplete market pricing mechanisms to adjust for the 
uncertainties associated with the bond’s cash flows. Here, we present two such 
mechanisms: the Wang transform, and indifference pricing. 
3.1.  Pricing the SIB using Wang Transform (Wang) 
The Wang transform is an example of a distortion method that transforms one probability 
measure to another and was proposed by Wang as a unified pricing mechanism for both 
insurance and financial risks. It can also be seen as a minimum relative entropy 
distribution that satisfies a certain moment constraint (Reesor). The Wang transform 
reproduces the Black-Scholes option pricing formula, and the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model for determining rate of return for a risky asset, if the asset returns are normally 
distributed.  
The transformed probability distribution under the Wang transform is given by 
Fx,  3 aaD,Fx,   λ, (3.1) 
and the corresponding transformed density is 
fx, , λ  ^aD,Fx,   λ^aD,Fx,  Vx, , (3.2) 
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where λ is the risk aversion parameter,  is the vector of distribution parameters, and F 
and f are risk adjusted cumulative distribution and density functions respectively.  
To implement the Wang transform, we first compute the CDF’s of the skew normal, and 
the beta distributions. For the skew normal, 
F¢£¤¥-Z, [, \, ]2 3 a _Z  \] `  2 T _Z  \] , [`, (3.3) 
where T-. , . 2 is the Owen’s T function defined as 
T-x, [2 3 12§ l eD
H,gcH ;⁄ 1  ª;
«
m nª, (3.4) 
and a-. 2 is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.  
The cumulative distribution function for the beta distribution is 
F¬¤­®-Z, , 2 3  β°-1  Z2 , ρ, δ2β-ρ, δ2 , (3.5) 
where β-ρ, δ2 is the Beta function defined in equation (2.3), and β°-. , . , . 2 is the 
incomplete Beta function defined by 
β° ³1  Z2 , ρ, δ´  l -.2eD,-1  .2fD,
,g;
m n.. (3.6) 
Figure 11 shows how the risk adjustment affects the skew normal and the beta probability 
densities. 
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Figure 11: Risk adjusted skew normal (left) and beta (right) density functions for 
different values of risk aversion parameter. 
To better understand the effect of the Wang transform on the probability distribution, we 
plot the changes in mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis with the 
corresponding changes in the Wang risk aversion parameter. 
Figure 12 indicates that a positive change in the Wang risk aversion parameter shifts the 
skew normal distribution backward (lower mean), reduces standard deviation, but 
increases its skewness and kurtosis. So the overall effect is that the investor with higher 
risk aversion parameter decreases the probability of smaller and more probable gains, 
while increases the probability of small and more probable losses, and also increases the 
probability of higher and less probable gains. For the beta distribution, mean and 
skewness decrease, while standard deviation and kurtosis remain almost unchanged. The 
overall effect on the investor’s risk preferences is similar. Therefore, increasing risk 
aversion parameter in the beta distribution makes investor more risk averse than the skew 
normal distribution, as there is no increase in skewness or kurtosis for the beta 
distribution. 
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Figure 12: Effect of the Wang risk aversion parameter on distribution statistics. 
Changes in the distribution mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis are 
shown in top left, top right, bottom left and bottom right panels, respectively, for 
both the skew normal and the beta distributions.  
Since all the distribution parameters change almost linearly (can be seen in Figure 12) 
with the Wang risk aversion parameter for small changes in the risk aversion parameter 
around its reference value, we sum up the effect by calculating the slope of these lines. 
Slopes are shown in table 3. 
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 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewnewss Kurtosis 
Skew Normal -0.097 -0.071 0.055 0.040 
Beta -0.127 0.001 -0.146 -0.0001 
Table 3: Sensitivity of the skew normal and the beta distribution parameters on the 
Wang risk aversion parameter. 
This table shows that the beta distribution shows higher negative sensitivity to the change 
in the Wang risk aversion parameter. Therefore, we expect the beta distribution price to 
decrease more sharply with increase in the Wang risk aversion parameter.  
The Wang transform can be extended to the multivariate distributions, to yield (Kijima) 
Fx, µ 3 a{ ¶aD,F,x,, µ  · λ¸ρ,¸{¹|, , … , aD,F»x», µ  · λ¸ρ»¸
{
¹|, ¼, (3.7) 
where a{ is the multivariate normal distribution, F,, … , F» are the marginal CDFs, and λ,, … , λ» are the risk aversion parameters, and ρ½¸ is the correlation between x½ and x¸.  
To simplify calculations, we assume that the reconviction rates for all three cohorts of the 
Peterborough Prison are uncorrelated with each other. This implies that ρ½¸ is equal to 
zero for all i ¿ j, and ρ½¸ is equal to 1 for i  j. Hence, the equation (3.7) simplifies to: 
Fx, µ 3 a,aD,F,x,, µ  λ, … a{aD,F»x», µ  λ». (3.8) 
This shows that the risk adjusted joint distribution can be written as a product of the risk 
adjusted marginal distributions. Under this assumption of independence, the first three 
payouts can be priced using the marginal distributions for the reconviction rates of the 
first three cohorts. This leads to 
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P,-k, .1 , λ2 3 CDEÃG l +,-.,, 0, .12VÄG,-.,, [, \, ]2
,
D, n.,, (3.9) 
P;-k, .1 , λ2 3 CDEÃH l +;-.;, 0, .12VÄH,-.;, [, \, ]2
,
D, n.;, (3.10) 
P<-k, .1 , λ2 3 CDEÃI Å +<-.<, 0, .12VÄI,-.<, [, \, ]2,D, n.<, and (3.11) 
P=-k, .1 , λ2 3 CDEÃI Æ +=-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12VÄG,ÄH,ÄI,-.,, .;, .<, [, \, ]2
,
D, n.,n.;n.<, (3.12) 
where T,, T;, T< are the times when payments for first, second and third cohorts are 
made. 
Assuming that .,, .;, .< are independent and identically distributed random variables, we 
can then write equation 3.12 as 
P=-k, .1 , λ2
 CDEÃI Æ +=., 0, .1VÄG,-.,, [, \, ]2VÄH,-.;, [, \, ]2VÄI,-.<, [, \, ]2
,
D, n., (3.13) 
where . is the vector of reconviction rates .,, .;, .<, and the bond price then is 
P-k, .1 , λ2  P,-k, .1 , λ2  P;-k, .1 , λ2  P<-k, .1 , λ2  P=-k, .1 , λ2. (3.14) 
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Figure 13: Plot in the left panel shows the bond price with risk aversion parameter 
(), and plot in the right panel shows bond price with interest rate (r). 
Variation of price with the risk aversion parameter (λ), and interest rate (r) is shown in 
the Figure 13 above. Both plots in Figure 13 exhibit mild convexity. We compute the first 
and second derivative of the bond price with respect to both λ and K to get a quantitative 
estimate of the bond’s sensitivity to these parameters. 
 
ÈÉSCE
 Êg  ÊD2 Êm∆K  
+ÉËÌCZ}ªTE
 Êg  ÊD  2Êm2 Êm∆K;  
ÈÉSCÍ
 Êg  ÊD2 Êm∆Î  
+ÉËÌCZ}ªTÍ
 Êg  ÊD  2Êm2 Êm∆Î;  
Beta Distribution 4.95 13.57 9.70 12.85 
Skew Normal 
Distribution 
4.95 13.57 8.92 6.62 
Table 4: Slope and convexity of price curves for 1% change in the values of interest 
rate and risk aversion parameter for   . ,   %, ∆
  .  and ∆  . . g refers to the price at lower /, and D refers to the price at higher /. Hence, 
the slope is defined to be the negative of the actual slope.  
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Table 4 shows that, for a given level of interest rate and risk aversion, the price computed 
with the beta distribution is more sensitive to changes in risk aversion parameter than the 
skew normal distribution, while both the skew normal and the beta distribution prices 
have the same sensitivity with interest rate. This higher sensitivity of the beta distribution 
price on risk aversion parameter (Î) is consistent with the observations of Figure 12. For 
the skew normal distribution, increasing Î increases skewness and kurtosis, and offsets 
some of the price reduction coming from decreasing mean. However, no such increase in 
skewness and kurtosis is observed for the beta distribution, and hence the price decline is 
steeper.  
Next, we look at the sensitivity of the bond price to the distribution parameters. The price 
of the bond with the skew normal distribution parameters is shown in the left panel of 
Figure 14. The price decreases linearly with increasing the value of position parameter 
(\), as increasing \ shifts the distribution forward and increases the probability of 
reduction in reconviction rate. While price appears almost insensitive to the skewness 
parameter ([), though it actually increases with increasing [ as more skewed distribution 
increases the probability of events in the right tail. However, skewness causes much 
smaller change in price than the position parameter, and makes the change invisible on 
the graph. Therefore, a small decrease in the position parameter can offset a large change 
in the skewness parameter. An example of this result has been observed in Section 2.3 
during the calculation of sensitivity of distribution parameters to the rehab program 
weights and bins. While changing the choice of weights and bins affect skewness 
parameter significantly, these changes are mostly offset by much smaller changes in the 
position parameter, and the price does not change significantly.    
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Figure 14: The effect of risk adjustment on the bond price.    corresponds to no 
risk adjustment, and the price there is just the expected present value of all the 
payouts. 
For the beta distribution, the price’s dependence on each parameter is almost a mirror 
image of its dependence on the other parameter. This is expected because each 
parameter’s role in the probability distribution is a mirror image of the other distribution. 
If we change Ï to Ï in the probability density function of the beta distribution, and 
switch  with , the probability density function remains unchanged. 
3.2. Indifference Pricing 
We now use the indifference pricing principle to calculate the fair bond price. We assume 
that investor’s utility is exponential. This assumption allows us to write down an explicit 
function for the bond price. Specifically, 
Ð-Ñ, Ò2:  1Ò -CDÓ Y  12, (3.15) 
where Ñ is the wealth and Ò is the risk aversion parameter for the investor.  
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Now the utility of having the initial wealth Ñ is 
ÐY-Ñ, Ò2:  Ð-Ñ, Ò2, (3.16) 
while the utility of investing in the risky bond (assuming .,, .;, .< are i.i.d) is: 
ÐbÔ{Õ-Ñ, S, γ2:  ×ÐÑ  S  A-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02
 Æ ÐÑ  S,D, A-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02 V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<, 
(3.17) 
where p is the price paid for the bond, A is the payout function of the bond, and V-. 2 is 
the probability density function for the drop in reconviction rate. 
The fair price of the bond is then calculated as the price that makes the utility of holding 
an initial wealth Ñ, given by ÐY, equal to the expected utility of investing in the risky 
asset, given by ÐbÔ{Õ. This leads to: 
S-0, .0, γ2  1γ Ë ØÆ CDÙÚ-.1,.2,.3,0,.02
,
D, V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<Û. (3.18) 
Variation of the fair price with the risk aversion parameter is shown in Figure 15 below. 
 Having obtained the fair price function, we first see which value of the risk aversion 
parameter corresponds to the risk neutral price of the bond.  Since a risk neutral investor 
has a linear utility function, its risk aversion parameter would be zero, as it would make 
the utility function equal to the investor's wealth Ñ. This can be easily seen by expanding 
the investor's utility function given in equation (3.15). That is, we start by expanding the 
exponential function   
Ð-Ñ2  1Ò -CDÓ Y  12  1Ò -1  Ò Ñ  -Ò Ñ2;  Ü  12 (3.19) 
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Ý Ð-Ñ2  Ñ  Ò Ñ;  Ü,  
and for Ò  0, we get (3.20) 
Ý Ð-Ñ2  Ñ, (3.21) 
Hence the risk-neutral value of the risk aversion parameter is γ  0. Using equation 
(3.18), we see that the right hand side of equation (3.21) is simply the risk adjusted price, 
and hence the risk neutral price is simply the present value of the future payout 
S-0, .0,  γ2  ×jA-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02k. (3.22) 
 
 
Figure 15: Dotted lines indicate the expected present value of the bond, and the solid 
lines show the risk adjusted price of the bond. Both curves have been drawn for the 
reference parameters defined in equations (2.11) and (2.12). 
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Chapter 4  
4. Connection between the Wang and Utility Formulations 
Having calculated the risk adjusted price in two different ways, we compare the key 
results of the two methods. First, we obtain a relationship between the Wang risk 
aversion parameter and the utility risk aversion parameter, such that we get the same 
price in both formulations. We start with a value of the Wang risk aversion parameter, 
calculate the corresponding risk adjusted price, and then find the utility risk aversion 
parameter that leads to the same price. The curve thus obtained is plotted in the Figure 
16. 
Now we compare the bond’s sensitivity to the risk aversion parameter and the interest 
rate under the two pricing mechanisms for both the skew normal and the beta 
distributions. For that purpose, we choose Î  1. This corresponds to ÒbXcd  4.34, and ÒW1XY  4.10. Then we plot the price calculated using the Wang transform and the utility 
formulation for small changes in interest rate and risk aversion levels around their 
reference values. Results are shown in Figure 17 and 18. 
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Figure 16: Utility risk aversion parameter plotted with the Wang risk aversion 
parameter for both the skew normal and the beta distributions using the reference 
parameters.  
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Figure 17: Variation in the fair price with changes in interest rate (left panel) and 
risk aversion (right panel) for the skew normal distribution. 
 
Figure 18: Variation in the fair price with changes in interest rate (risk aversion) 
and risk aversion (right panel) for the beta distribution. 
These figures show that the price calculated using the Wang distortion measure is more 
sensitive to changes in both interest and risk aversion, for both the skew normal and the 
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beta distributions. Moreover, the percentage change in price with either interest rate or 
the risk aversion parameter is higher in the case of the skew normal distribution than in 
the case of the beta distribution. This also confirms the result obtained in Table 3, which 
showed that the beta distribution is more sensitive to the changes in the Wang risk 
aversion parameters, as compared to the skew normal distribution. 
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Chapter 5  
5. Pricing under Ambiguity Aversion 
As described in Section 2.1, the reference model for the probability of a reduction in 
reconviction rate is based on a relatively small dataset, and may not be a very accurate 
representation of the outcome of the Peterborough Prison rehab program. Moreover, this 
lack of quantitative data would be an essential feature of any such SIB program, because 
the outcomes of prison rehabilitation programs have historically not been measured very 
rigorously. Therefore, any pricing mechanism for such bonds has to take into account this 
deficiency in order to determine the fair price.  
Here, we incorporate this lack of data as ambiguity in the reference model, and treat is as 
a source of uncertainty, separate from the risk of the bond’s payout for a given model. To 
adjust for this ambiguity, we allow investors to consider probability distributions that are 
different from the reference distribution at the cost of paying a penalty. In other words, 
the investor is allowed to consider models other than the reference model at the cost of 
increasing its utility for a given model. We choose the relative entropy between the 
relative model and the candidate model as the penalty term (Jaimungal) 
Þ-ßà|ß2  µ ×ájÕáÕá Ë-ÕáÕá 2k, (5.1) 
where ÕáÕá  is the Radon-Nykodym derivative of ßà with respect to ß, µ is a measure of 
faith in the reference model (ß) and ×á represents expected value under model ß. Radon-
Nykodym derivative ÕáÕá  is 
ÕáÕá  zâ-ã2zä-ã2, (5.2) 
where Vå-æ2 is the probability density function of the candidate measure evaluated at æ 
and Vã-æ2 is the probability density function of the reference model evaluated at æ. 
Hence, the penalty function for the skew normal and the beta distributions become: 
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h¢£¤¥-[, \, ]2 3 Å VW1XY-Z, [, \, ]2 è ln -zëìíî-ï,«,ð,ñ2zëìíî-2 2òDò nZ, (5.3) 
h¬¤­®-, 2 3 l VbXcd-Z, , 2 è ln -VbXcd-x, , 2VbXcd-Z2 2
,
D, nZ (5.4) 
where V and V are the PDFs of candidate and reference models respectively.  
In the coming sections, we see how the ambiguity adjustment affects the bond price, and 
compare these effects for every choice of probability distribution and the pricing 
mechanism. Each subsection shows the calculation of the ambiguity adjusted price for a 
given choice of pricing mechanism and probability distribution, and concludes with a 
comparison of prices obtained under different methodologies. 
5.1. Robust Indifference Pricing 
To include the ambiguity aversion in the indifference pricing mechanism, we add the 
penalty term defined in equation (5.3) to the expected utility given in equation (3.17). 
This leads to 
ÐbÔ{Õ-Ñ, S, Ò, µ23 µ h
 ØÆ ÐÑ  S  A., 0, Ñ, .0, Ò  V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,D, Û 
(5.5) 
where  is the set of distribution parameters, A-. , … , . 2 is the payout function for the 
bond, and f-. 2 is the probability density function for the drop in reconviction rate. 
The fair price is then calculated as the minimum price that equates the penalized expected 
utility to the utility of investing in the risk free asset. With the addition of the penalty 
term, price function becomes 
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S-0, .0, γ2  1γ Ë ØÆ CDÙÚ-.1,.2,.3,0,.02
,
D, V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<Û
 1γ ln _1  µ CÙY  h`. 
(5.6) 
Comparing equation (5.6) with (3.18), we see that the effect of the penalty term is to add 
a µ dependent term in the price function. This term, however also depends on the 
investor’s initial wealth (Ñ). While, in reality, an investor’s ambiguity aversion may 
depend on the initial wealth of the investor, we would like to remove this dependence to 
be able to study the effect of ambiguity in the reference model alone. Therefore we 
replace µ by µ CDÙ¥ in equation (5.6). The modified price function then becomes 
S-0, .0, γ2  1γ Ë ØÆ CDÙÚ-.1,.2,.3,0,.02
,
D, V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<Û
 1γ ln _1  µ h`. 
(5.7) 
Since the penalty term is always positive by definition, the effect of the penalty term in 
the price function is to increase the price for a given level of risk aversion and a given set 
of distribution parameters. At this point, it suggests that increasing the ambiguity 
aversion increases the price. But it is not the case, as the actual price under ambiguity 
aversion is calculated for that model that minimizes the price function in equation (5.6). 
Hence, the ambiguity adjusted price cannot exceed the risk adjusted price. Complete 
formula for the price function can be written as 
S-0, .0, γ, µ2  ó}Ë«,ð ¶1γ Ë ØÆ CDÙÚ-.1,.2,.3,0,.02
,
D, V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<Û
 1γ ln _1  µ h`¼, 
(5.8) 
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while the corresponding risk adjusted price is given in equation (3.18). 
Therefore, while (5.7) has an additional positive term compared to the risk adjusted price 
given in equation (3.18), the freedom to choose [, \ different from the reference 
parameters ([, \) can make the ambiguity adjusted price smaller than the risk adjusted 
price.   
5.1.1. Robust Indifference Pricing for the Skew Normal 
Distribution 
Using equation (5.8), we can write down the ambiguity adjusted price for the skew 
normal distribution simply by replacing h with h¢£¤¥-[, \, ]2. Hence the ambiguity 
adjusted skew normal price is 
S-0, .0, γ, µ2  ó}Ë«,ð ¶1γ Ë ØÆ CDÙÚ-.1,.2,.3,0,.02
,
D, V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<Û
 1γ ln1  µ h¢£¤¥-[, \, ]2¼. 
(5.9) 
Before calculating the actual ambiguity adjusted price (given in equation (5.9)), we first 
plot the price function given in equation (5.7) to develop some intuition about the penalty 
function. Plots of this price function with respect to the model parameters are shown in 
Figures 19 and 20. Figure 19 shows the variation of the ambiguity adjusted price versus µ 
for different values of skewness and position parameters of the candidate model. The 
figures show that the slope of the fair price is almost independent of µ, but increases as 
the candidate measure deviates away from the reference measure in either direction. This 
is an expected result because any deviation from the reference model increases the value 
of the penalty function h¢£¤¥-[, \, ]2, which is the coefficient of µ in equation (5.7), and 
hence increases the derivative of price with respect to theta.  
It is also clear from the Figure 19 that the price curves in the left panel exhibit a higher a 
slope than the curves in the right panel. Since the only difference between the curves in 
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the left and right panels is that the curves in the left panels are evaluated at \, while the 
curves in the right panel are evaluated at [. Therefore, we can conclude that the penalty 
function is more sensitive to changes in the skewness parameter than changes in the 
position parameter.  
Figure 19: The fair price of the bond for different values of skewness and position 
parameters is shown. Price increases with increasing , all else held fixed. Curves in 
the left panel are plotted by holding the position parameter () fixed at    
and the curves in the right panel are plotted by holding the skewness parameter () 
fixed at   . For the right panel,     and   . 
In order to further confirm this intuition, we plot the price with the skewness and the 
position parameter in Figure 20. Here, the solid curves represent the total price, and the 
dotted curves represent the ambiguity component (total price less the risk only price) of 
the total price. Dotted price curve in the left panel of Figure 20 (almost identical to the 
solid curve) shows a much larger variation in price than the curve in the right panel of 
Figure 20, confirming that the penalty function is more sensitive to the variation in the 
skewness parameter. Moreover, these plots also show that increasing µ shifts the price 
curves upward, reducing the region where price lies below the reference price. Hence, for 
very large values of µ the price cannot be minimized below the reference price, and 
44 
 
ambiguity adjusted price would equal the risk adjusted price. Therefore, we interpret µ as 
the faith in reference model. The larger the µ, more confident the investor is about the 
reference model, and closer the ambiguity adjusted price is to the risk adjusted price. 
Figure 20: Variation of the fair price plot with the skewness parameter (left panel) 
and the position parameter (right panel) for   . . Dotted lines in both panels 
have been moved up, by an amount equal to the reference price, to be visible on the 
plot. 
Now, we move on to the actual ambiguity adjusted price given in equation (5.8). Based 
on the results obtained so far, we can see that changing the skewness parameter in any 
direction about its reference level increases the price, and increasing position parameter 
above its reference level increases the price function. Therefore the minimum price is 
expected to be achieved by decreasing the position parameter below its reference level, 
and by keeping the skewness parameter at or above its reference level.  
A surface plot of the fair price with skewness and position parameters is shown in Figure 
21. The minimum level of this surface plot is the ambiguity adjusted for a given µ (faith 
in reference model). A contour plot of the price function is shown in the right panel of the 
Figure 21. It shows that the price lies in a triangular region in the lower right corner of 
the plot.  
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Figure 21: Surface (left panel) and contour (right panel) plots with the skew normal 
distribution parameters are shown. For both panels,    and   . 
Minimizing the price function with respect to both [ and \ simultaneously for various 
values of µ yields a three dimensional plot of optimal values of the skew normal 
parameters for each value of µ. These parameters are plotted in the left panel of Figure 
22, and it can be seen that the parameters approach the reference parameters for higher 
values of µ (defined in equation (2.11)). This is because increasing µ increases the 
relative effect of the ambiguity term in the price function, and for sufficiently large 
values of µ, minimizing the price function is equivalent to minimizing the penalty 
function, which is minimized when candidate model is the same as the reference model. 
Hence, for sufficiently large µ, the optimal ambiguity adjusted model is simply the 
reference model. This result is also consistent with our interpretation of µ as the faith in 
reference model.  
46 
 
Figure 22: The left panel shows that with increasing faith in the reference model, 
candidate model approaches the reference model and two prices get closer. The 
right panel shows the ambiguity and risk adjusted prices with the faith in reference 
model. For both panels,  =1. 
Finally, the ambiguity adjusted price as a function of µ is shown in the right panel of 
Figure 22. For small values of µ, the investor has little faith in the reference model, and 
would pay only a small price due to high ambiguity. As µ increases, the investor puts 
more faith in the reference model and the resulting decrease in ambiguity allows her to 
pay a higher price. For infinitely large values of µ, the investor has full faith in the 
reference model, and the ambiguity adjusted price approaches the price obtained by 
reference model.  
In the end, we compare the ambiguity adjusted price curve with the risk adjusted price 
curve evaluated at the optimal parameters calculated by minimizing the penalty term in 
the ambiguity function (shown in the left panel of Figure 23). The first thing we notice is 
that the ambiguity adjusted price is not the same as the risk adjusted price evaluated at the 
optimal parameters. The ambiguity adjusted price (blue curve) is slightly higher than the 
risk adjusted price (green curve) for small µ, but both price curves (blue and black 
curves) approach the same asymptotic limit (red curve) for large µ. Therefore, we can 
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conclude that the effect of ambiguity adjustment cannot be completely modeled by 
changing the candidate model and making a constant shift in the level of risk aversion in 
the risk adjusted price function. The difference between the ambiguity adjusted price and 
the risk only price is shown in the right panel of Figure 23, and it exhibits a sharp decline 
as µ increases.  
 
  
Figure 23: The left panel shows the ambiguity adjusted price (blue curve) and the 
risk adjusted price evaluated at the optimal parameters (green curve) as a function 
of . All curves in the left panel are plotted using the same level of risk aversion. 
The right panel shows the difference between ambiguity adjusted price and the risk 
adjusted price evaluated at the optimal parameters. This difference can be seen as 
the effect of ambiguity aversion that cannot be incorporated with the risk aversion 
only.  
 
Figure 24 decomposes the difference between the ambiguity adjusted price and the 
reference risk adjusted price into the contribution from change in the optimal parameters 
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and the contribution from the decrease in risk aversion. The red curve shows the change 
in price that results from a change in parameters of the model, and the blue curve shows 
the change in price that comes from decrease in risk aversion level. The difference 
between the two curves is always equal to hundred percent. The ratio of the price change 
attributed to the change in parameters to the price change attributed to the change in risk 
aversion is shown in the panel of the Figure 24. Whether this ratio increases or decreases 
depends on how quickly the risk adjusted price approaches the ambiguity adjusted price. 
If the risk adjusted price quickly approaches the ambiguity adjusted price, the 
denominator shrinks faster than the numerator, and the ratio increases. However, if the 
risk adjusted price approaches the ambiguity adjusted price very slowly, the denominator 
stays almost constant and the ratio decreases. From Figure 24, we can conclude that the 
change in parameters plays a less important role in determining the ambiguity adjusted 
price for higher values of µ, and that the risk adjusted price approaches the ambiguity 
adjusted price slowly.  
Figure 24: Difference between the ambiguity adjusted price and the reference risk 
price is decomposed into the contribution from a change in model parameters (red 
curve) and a contribution from decrease in risk aversion level (blue curve) is shown 
in the left panel. The right panel shows the ratio of the red curve to the blue curve.   
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5.1.2. Robust Indifference Pricing for Beta Distribution 
Now we follow the same procedure to calculate ambiguity adjusted price for the beta 
distribution. The ambiguity adjusted price for the beta distribution can be obtained by 
following the same steps as above. First, after the addition of penalty term, the expected 
utility of investing in the bond is given by 
ÐbÔ{Õ-Ñ, S, Ò, µ2 3µ h¬¤­®-, 2 ô Ðj-Ñ  S2  A-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02, Òk  V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<,D, , 
(5.10) 
where h¬¤­® is the penalty term for beta distribution defined in (4.4). 
The fair price of the bond is then obtained by equating the utility given in (5.10) with the 
utility of having initial wealth Ñ. The fair price is shown below 
S-0, .0, γ2  ó}Ëe,fjD,Ù Ë _ô CDÙÚ-.1,.2,.3,0,.02,D, V-.,2V-.;2V-.<2n.,n.;n.<` ,Ù ln1  µ h¬¤­®-, 2k. (5.11) 
Now we look at the variation of the price function (price before minimizing over the 
distribution parameters) with the distribution parameters (, ), and it is shown in Figures 
25 and 26. We notice from Figure 25 that as  and  move away from their reference 
values, the price becomes more sensitive to theta. This is, as described in the previous 
section, due to the fact that the slope of the price with theta is proportional to the penalty 
function, and the penalty function increases as parameters move farther away from their 
reference values.  
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Figure 25: Variation of the price function with the faith in reference model for the 
beta distribution parameters  (left panel) and  (right panel) is shown.  
Figure 26 shows the variation of the price function with the parameters of the beta 
distribution. We notice that for µ  0, the price curve with  is a mirror image of the 
price curve with rho, an outcome of the symmetry of the underlying beta distribution 
(with -) . The ambiguity component appears to be less sensitive to the changes in 
parameters above their reference values than the changes in parameters below their 
reference values. This tiny asymmetry in the ambiguity component makes the total price 
curve plotted against  nearly symmetric around its reference value. However, for the 
price curve with , this makes the total price curve more asymmetric around its reference 
value. Hence, the price can lowered by moving  above its reference value, but the effect 
of  is ambiguous.   
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Figure 26: Plot of the price function for beta distribution parameters  (left panel) 
and  (right panel) for   .  is shown. Point where all curves intersect is the 
reference value of the parameter. 
Now, we draw a surface plot of the price function with both parameters, and show it 
along with the price contours in Figure 27. Both plots of Figure 27 show that the 
minimum price lies along a thin region around the line   . Actual values of the 
optimal parameters that minimize the price are shown in Figure 28, and the plot confirms 
our earlier intuition about the behavior of price with  and  as the optimal  is higher 
than its reference value, while  oscillates around its reference value. And the minimum 
price for a given value of µ obtained by minimizing the price over distribution parameters 
(, ) is shown in right panel of Figure 28. We can see in Figure 28 that optimal 
parameters, which lead to minimum price for a given value of µ approach the reference 
parameters, as was the case for the skew normal distribution. As a result the ambiguity 
adjusted price (shown in the right panel of Figure 28) also approaches the price under 
reference model for large values of µ. 
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Figure 27: Surface (left panel) and contour (right panel) plots of the price function 
with the beta distribution parameters are shown. 
 
  
Figure 28: The left panel shows the variation of the optimal parameters and the 
right panel shows the variation of the ambiguity adjusted price of the bond with the 
faith in reference model, for   . . 
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Figure 29: The left panel compares the ambiguity adjusted price (blue curve) with 
the risk adjusted price evaluated at the optimal parameters (green curve). The right 
panel shows the difference between the ambiguity adjusted price and the risk 
adjusted price.  
Here again, we see that the ambiguity adjusted price approaches the risk adjusted price 
calculated at reference parameters, but lies always above the risk only price for µ : ∞. 
Figure 30 decomposes the difference between the ambiguity adjusted price and the 
reference risk adjusted price into the contribution from change in optimal parameters and 
the contribution from the decrease in risk aversion. The red curve shows the change in 
price that results from a change in parameters of the model, and the blue curve shows the 
change in price that comes from a decrease in risk aversion level. The difference between 
the two curves is always equal to one hundred percent. Plot in the right panel of the 
Figure 30 shows the ratio of the red curve to the blue curve. Similar to the case of the 
skew normal distribution, we notice that for the beta distribution, the parameters’ 
contribution to the price increases with increasing µ.  
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Figure 30: Difference between the ambiguity adjusted price and the reference risk 
price is decomposed into the contribution from a change in model parameters (red 
curve) and a contribution from decrease in risk aversion level (blue curve) is shown 
in the left panel. Right panel shows the ratio of the red curve to the blue curve.   
5.1.3. Comparison of Ambiguity’s Effect on the Skew Normal 
and the Beta Distribution under Utility Formulation 
We are now in a position to compare the effects of the ambiguity adjustment on the bond 
price under the beta and the skew normal distribution. As described earlier, this effect can 
be broken down into a change in price that results from the change in model parameters, 
and a change in price that comes from the change in the level of risk aversion. Since both 
components of ambiguity adjustment have identical dependence on µ, it is enough to 
compare any one of the two components. We, therefore, compare only the contribution 
that comes from the change in the risk aversion level, along with the ratio of the two 
contributions. Results are shown in Figure 31. Both curves show different behavior.  
Contribution of the penalty term for the beta distribution decrease, while it increases for 
the skew normal distribution. The ratio plotted in the right panel shows the opposite 
behavior, as it has the contribution of the penalty term in the denominator. This implies 
that the risk adjusted price approaches the ambiguity adjusted price more quickly for the 
skew normal distribution as compared to the beta distribution.  
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Figure 31: Effect of ambiguity adjustment on the skew normal and the beta 
distributions. The left panel shows the contribution of the penalty term for both 
distributions, and right panel shows the ratio of the contribution of the change in 
parameters to the contribution of the penalty term.  
5.2. Ambiguity Adjustment with the Wang Transform  
In this section, we incorporate the effect of ambiguity in the Wang pricing mechanism. 
We use the same penalty functions that we used in the utility formulation (defined in 
equations (5.1) through (5.4)).  However, for the Wang transform we do not have a utility 
function to add this penalty term to. We, therefore, make the Wang risk aversion 
parameter a function of this penalty term. That is, we modify the Wang transform given 
in equation (3.1) to 
Fx, , λ, θ  ajaD,Fx,   λ-θ, 2 k (5.12) 
where  is the set of distribution parameters, and the λ-θ, 2 is the Wang risk aversion 
parameter, which now depends on the ambiguity aversion parameter and the distribution 
parameters.  
We define the dependence of risk aversion on ambiguity aversion as 
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λθ,   λ –  θ è h (5.13) 
where h is the penalty function for distribution parameters  defined in equations 
(5.1) through (5.4).  
Hence, the effect of ambiguity aversion is to allow investors to consider models different 
from the reference model at the cost of reducing its risk aversion for a given model. This 
treatment is similar to the one used in the utility formulation, where the presence of 
ambiguity allows investors to consider other models for the outcome at the cost of 
increasing its utility for a given model. However, the ambiguity aversion directly reduces 
the risk aversion parameter in the Wang transform, while in the utility formulation it does 
not directly affect the risk aversion parameter.  
The Wang adjusted probability density function, in the presence of ambiguity term, then 
becomes 
føx, , λ, θ:  ^aD,Fx,   λ –  θ è hk^jaD,Fx, 2k V-x, [, \, ]2, (5.14) 
where fø-x, , λ, θ2 is the risk and ambiguity adjusted probability distribution function. 
The ambiguity adjusted price of the bond under the Wang transform can then be written 
as 
P-k, z£, λ, θ2  MinjEøjB-z,, z;, z<, k, z£2kk, (5.15) 
where EøjB-z,, z;, z<, k, z£2kis the expected value of the Bond’s payout under the risk and 
ambiguity adjusted probability distribution given in (5.14). That is, we find the ambiguity 
adjusted price by finding the expected value of the bond’s payout under the probability 
distribution that minimizes the expected present value of the bond. 
57 
 
5.2.1. Ambiguity Adjustment for the Skew Normal Distribution 
Now we apply the mechanism devised above to calculate the ambiguity adjusted price for 
the skew normal distribution. For the skew normal distribution, the fair price can be 
written explicitly as 
P-k, z£, λ, θ2
 Min«,ð ¶Æ B-z,, z;, z<, k, z£2fýG,ýH,ýI,ø-z,, z;, z<, [, \, ], λ, θ2
,
D, dz,dz;dz<¼, (5.16) 
where fýG,ýH,ýI,ø-z,, z;, z<, [, \, λ, θ2 is the risk and ambiguity adjusted joint probability 
density function for the skew normal distribution. 
For simplicity, we assume that the outcomes of three cohorts are uncorrelated. Under this 
assumption, the joint probability density function can be written as the product of the 
marginal density functions of the outcomes of the three cohorts, 
fýG,ýH,ýI,ø-z,, z;, z<, [, \, ], λ, θ2 fýG,ø-z,, [, \, ], λ, θ2f;,ø-z;, [, \, ], λ, θ2fýG,ø-z<, [, \, ], λ, θ2. (5.17) 
Now we study the dependence of the price function (price before minimizing over the 
distribution parameters) on the distribution parameters. Variation of the price with respect 
to the skewness and the position parameters is shown in Figures 32 and 33. As observed 
in the utility formulation, the price function is much more sensitive to the changes in the 
skewness parameter below its reference value than the changes in the skweness parameter 
above its reference value or changes in the position parameter. This implies that the price 
can be minimized by reducing the position parameter below its reference value. 
Moreover, for higher θ, the possible reduction in price that can be achieved by moving 
away from reference parameters decreases. Hence, we can interpret θ as the faith in 
reference model.  
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Figure 32: Variation of the fair price function with  for different values of 
skewness (left panel) and position (right panel) parameters is shown.  
 
Figure 33: Variation of the fair price function with the skewness  and the position 
parameters is shown in left and right panels respectively.  
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Figure 34 shows a surface and contour plot of the fair price with the skew normal 
parameters. We see an elliptical region in the contour plot (only a part of it is visible) 
where the lowest of the price occurs. The region is almost identical to the one observed in 
the utility formulation. Figure 35 shows the optimal parameters and the price evaluated at 
those parameters. As expected, the optimal parameters as well as the price approach their 
reference values as the faith in reference model increases. Behavior of the optimal 
parameters with the faith in reference model is also consistent with the utility 
formulation.  
Figure 34: Surface (left panel), contour (right panel) plots of the price function with 
the skew normal distribution parameters are shown. 
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Figure 35: The optimal parameters (left panel) and the fair price calculated at the 
optimal parameters (right panel) are shown. 
In the end, we compare the ambiguity adjusted price with the risk adjusted price only 
calculated evaluated at the optimal parameters (shown in Figure 36). And we notice that 
the difference is always is bigger than zero, and it decreases as the faith in the reference 
model increases. This is consistent with the result obtained in the utility formulation, and 
with our interpretation that the ambiguity aversion decreases the investor’s risk aversion, 
and the lower the faith in reference model, the greater the reduction in risk aversion 
compared to its reference level. 
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Figure 36: Comparison of the ambiguity adjusted price with the risk adjusted price 
evaluated at optimal parameters is shown in the left panel. The right panel shows 
the difference between the two prices as a percentage of the risk adjusted price (blue 
curve in the left panel). 
 
Figure 37: Comparison of the two contribution to the ambiguity adjusted price. The 
left panel shows the individual contributions as a percentage of difference between 
the ambiguity adjusted price and the reference risk adjusted price, and the right 
panel shows the ratio of the two contributions.  
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Figure 37 compares the contribution to the ambiguity adjustment that come from the 
change in parameters and a change in risk aversion. For the Wang transform, the 
percentage contribution of both terms increases with increasing θ, and the relative 
contribution of the change in parameters decreases with increasing θ. This is in contrast 
to the utility pricing mechanism, where the change in percentage contributions decrease 
and the relative contribution of the parameters increase with θ. This implies that for the 
Wang transform, increasing θ increases the effects of both the change in parameters and 
the risk aversion level, while both these effects decrease with increasing θ in the utility 
formulation.  
5.2.2. Ambiguity Adjustment with Wang Transform for Beta 
Distribution 
Now we apply the same procedure to the beta distribution to incorporate ambiguity 
aversion in it. The ambiguity adjusted CDF and PDF are 
Føjx, , , λ, θk  ajaD,Fjx, , k  λ –  θ è h¬¤­®-, 2kk and  (5.18) 
fø-x, , , λ, θ2  Gjï,e,fkg – øè	-e,f2kjGjï,e,fk2k V-x, , 2, (5.19) 
respectively, where h¬¤­®-, 2 is the penalty function for the beta distribution, and ,  
are the parameters of the beta distribution. 
Using these functions, ambiguity adjusted price under the beta distribution becomes 
P-k, z£, λ, θ2 Min«,ðjô B-z,, z;, z<, k, z£2fýG,ýH,ýI,ø-z,, z;, z<, , , λ, θ2,D, dz,dz;dz<k, (5.20) 
where fýG,ýH,ýI,ø-z,, z;, z<, , , λ, θ2 is the joint beta probability density function of the 
outcome of the reconviction rate for the three cohorts. 
Now we look at the effect of the distribution parameters on the price function. Figure 38 
shows the variation in the price function with the ambiguity parameter (θ) for different 
values of  and . As seen earlier in the case of the skew normal distribution, price 
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function becomes more sensitive to θ as  and  move away from their reference values. 
This again reflects the fact that penalty term’s contribution to price becomes more 
significant as the candidate model becomes significantly different from the reference 
model.    
Figure 38: Variation of the price function with  for different  (left panel) and  
(right panel) is shown. 
Figure 39 shows the variation of the price function with respect to the distribution 
parameters -, ). Overall behavior of the price function is similar to the behavior 
observed using the utility formulation. The price function increases (decreases) with an 
increase (decrease) in , while it decreases (increases) with an increase (decrease) in .  
However, there is also an important difference in the behavior of the ambiguity 
component of the price function compared to its behavior in the utility formulation. In the 
case of the utility pricing mechanism, the ambiguity component of the price always 
increases as the distribution parameters move away from their reference values. 
However, this is not the case here, as the ambiguity component increases for small 
changes around the reference parameters, but then it starts decreasing, and eventually 
approaches zero. This appears counter-intuitive as moving the distribution parameters 
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away from their reference values increases the penalty term, which decreases the 
investor’s risk aversion, and hence, it should increase the price. But this is not what we 
observe. And the reason is that for the Wang transform, when the beta distribution 
parameters become sufficiently different from the reference parameters, the beta 
distribution becomes more peaked and highly concentrated. This, in turn, decreases the 
expected payout of the bond, and leads to a smaller price. Therefore, this counter-
intuitive result is a limitation of defining the ambiguity adjusted Wang transform in this 
way. We do not see such result in utility based pricing, because the presence of an 
additional penalty dependent term in the price function (defined in equation ) keeps the 
price from decreasing, even if the first term decreases. The price function of the 
ambiguity adjusted Wang transform, on the other hand, does not have any such term, and 
therefore price decreases. However, we can avoid this problem numerically by restricting 
the range of  and  values such that the ambiguity adjusted price does not fall below the 
its risk adjusted level. Keeping this limitation in mind, we show a surface and contour 
plot for the price function for a range for   and  where the price function does not hit 
zero. These plots are shown in Figure 40. 
Figure 39: Variation of the price function with the beta distribution parameters  
(left panel) and  (right panel) is shown. 
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Figure 40: Surface (left panel) and contour (right panel) plots of the price function 
with  and  are shown.  
Comparing Figure 40 with Figure 27, we see that the minimum price region for the Wang 
transform appears identical to the region obtained using utility formulation. So, despite 
the above mentioned limitation of the Wang transform, it can still be used to calculate the 
optimal parameters and the optimal price.    
The ambiguity adjusted price for the beta distribution under the Wang transform is shown 
in Figure 41. For large values of θ, the price approaches the reference price, as expected 
from earlier discussions. In the end, we compare the ambiguity adjusted price with the 
risk only price in Figure 42, and we obtain the expected result that the ambiguity price 
lies above the risk only price for small θ, but approaches the same asymptotic limit for 
large θ.  
Figure 43 compares the contributions of the penalty term and the change in parameters to 
the ambiguity adjusted price, and the percentage contribution of both components 
increase with increasing θ. This result is similar to the one obtained for the skew normal 
distribution under the Wang transform.  
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Figure 41: The optimal parameters (left panel) and the ambiguity adjusted price 
(right panel) with the faith in reference model are shown. 
 
Figure 42: Comparison of ambiguity adjusted price with the risk only price 
evaluated at optimal parameters is shown in the left panel. The right panel shows 
the difference as a percentage of the risk adjusted price.  
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Figure 43: Comparison of the two contribution to the ambiguity adjusted price. The 
left panel shows the individual contributions as a percentage of difference between 
ambiguity adjusted price and reference risk price, and the right panel shows the 
ratio of the two contributions. 
This implies that an increase in individual contributions due to a change in parameters 
and the level of risk aversion is a feature of the Wang transform, and not of the choice of 
distribution. Moreover, the ratio of the two contributions also decreases with θ, which is 
again consistent with the skew normal result under the Wang transform.    
5.2.3. Comparison of the Ambiguity’s Effect on the Skew Normal 
and the Beta Distribution under the Wang Transform 
Here, we compare the effect of incorporating ambiguity adjustment in the Wang 
transform on the skew normal and the beta distributions. We compare the contribution of 
the penalty term (change in risk aversion level) and the ratio of the contribution due to 
change in parameters to the contribution due to change in risk aversion, in Figure 44.  
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Figure 44: The left panel compares the effect of penalty term for the skew normal 
and the beta distributions, and the right panel compares the ratio of the two 
contributions for the skew normal and the beta distributions.  
Figure 44 shows that the beta distribution is more sensitive to the level of ambiguity 
aversion than the skew normal distribution, as the blue is more concave (convex) than the 
red curve in left (right) panel. This is in contrast to the case of the utility formulation, 
where ambiguity adjustment makes a similar impact on both the skew normal and the 
beta distributions.  
5.3. Comparison of the Wang and the Utility 
Formulations 
Now we compare the effect of ambiguity under the Wang and utility formulations for 
both the skew normal and the beta distributions. Figures 45 and 46 compare the 
ambiguity and risk adjusted prices (left panel), and the ratio of the two contributions to 
the ambiguity adjusted price (right panel). Both price curves (solid blue and green lines) 
in the left panel of Figure 45 have the same asymptotic limit. This implies that the 
ambiguity adjusted price under the Wang transform is more sensitive to the faith in 
reference model, as this curve has a higher curvature, and is always lower than the price 
under utility formulation. The ratio of the two contributions to the ambiguity adjusted 
price shows a similar pattern for both pricing mechanisms. The red curve lies slightly 
above the blue curve as the difference between the ambiguity and risk adjusted price 
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under the utility formulation (difference between solid and dotted blue lines in the left 
panel) is smaller than the difference between the ambiguity and risk adjusted price under 
the Wang formulation (difference between solid and dotted green lines in the left panel). 
For the beta distribution (shown in Figure 46), we see the same behavior for the 
ambiguity and risk adjusted prices (shown in the left panel). The price under the Wang 
transform is more curved than the price under the utility mechanism. The ratio of the two 
contributions to the ambiguity adjustment (shown in the right panel) in this case shows 
different behavior under the two pricing mechanisms. both pricing mechanisms show 
different behavior. The ratio decreases for the utility formulation for small values of θ, as 
the difference between the ambiguity and risk adjusted price (difference between solid 
and dotted blue lines in the left panel) increases sharply for small θ.  
 
   
Figure 45: Comparison of the Wang and the Utility formulations for the beta 
distribution. The left panel shows the ambiguity and risk adjusted prices for both 
pricing mechanisms, and the right panel shows the ratio of the parameters’ 
contribution to price to the penalty function’s contribution to price. 
 
70 
 
  
Figure 46: Comparison of the Wang and the Utility formulations for the beta 
distribution. The left panel shows the penalty function’s contribution to price, and 
the right panel shows the ratio of the parameters’ contribution to price to the 
penalty function’s contribution to price.  
This analysis of the decomposition of the ambiguity adjusted price can help investors 
determine the appropriate choice of pricing mechanism, for a given faith in reference 
model. This is because the change in price attributed to the change in parameters can be 
seen as a pure ambiguity effect, and the change in price attributed to the penalty function 
can be seen as a change due to a decrease in the investor’s risk aversion level. Therefore, 
the ratio of the change in price attributed to the change in parameters to the change in 
price attributed to the penalty function, can be interpreted as the discount that investor 
requires for ambiguity for giving up one unit of discount for risk. Hence, this ratio 
represents the investor’s ambiguity aversion relative to its risk aversion. We will call it 
the ambiguity to risk ratio. An investor with higher relative risk aversion (lower relative 
ambiguity aversion) would require more ambiguity discount to give up one unit of risk 
discount. An investor with lower relative aversion to ambiguity should choose a pricing 
mechanism that has the highest ambiguity to risk ratio, for a given level of faith in the 
reference model. Therefore, for an investor with lower relative ambiguity aversion, the 
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Wang transform is a better choice for the beta distribution, and the utility pricing 
mechanism is more suitable for the skew normal distribution. 
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Chapter 6  
6. Effect of Social Utility 
So far we have assumed that investors’ utility is derived solely from the financial return 
of the bond. However, a main incentive for investing in these bonds is their social impact, 
as evident by many charities and foundations investing in the bond. Therefore, we 
include another utility term to reflect the investor’s utility arising from the social impact 
of the bond.  So the overall utility of investor is combination of two terms: a financial 
utility that arises from the bond’s financial return and a social utility that arises from the 
bond’s impact on recidivism, specifically 
 
}ËQË}Q ª}}ªT: Ð,-Ñ, Ò,2  D,ÓG -CDÓG Y  12 ÈÉ}Q ª}}ªT: Ð;-.,, .;, .<, Ò;2  D,ÓH -CDÓH -ÄGgÄHgÄI2  12 R, (6.1) 
where Ñ is the investor’s wealth, .,, .;, .< are the change in reconviction rates for the 
three cohorts, .,  .;  .< is the total drop in recidivism rate, and Ò, measures the 
aversion to financial risk. Ò; plays the same role for the social utility that Ò, does for the 
financial utility. Therefore, we interpret Ò; as the investor's aversion to social risk, or 
uncertainty in the social impact of the program.  
The total utility is given by 
Ð-Ñ, Ò,, Ò;2  Ð,-Ñ, Ò,2  -×jA-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02k,2 Ð;-.,, .;, .<, Ò;-.122 (6.2) 
Where -×jA-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12k,2 is the strength of social utility relative to the financial 
utility, ×jA-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12k is the expected payout of the bond, and  is the current 
recidivism rate in the country. 
We make -×jA-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12k,2 a function of the bond’s expected payout and , as 
we expect investors to be more inclined to do charity if the bond’s expected payout and 
the recidivism rate is higher. Moreover, we expect the aversion to social risk (Ò;) to be a 
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function of .1. This is because the cap rate is the drop in the reconviction rate above 
which government does not pay more for further decreases in reconviction rate. Hence, 
the cap rate (.1) provides a natural measure for the drop in recidivism rate above which 
the investor’s social utility would stay almost constant with improving outcomes. For 
now, we will consider the -×jA-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12k,2 to be constant, independent of both ×jA-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12k and . 
6.1. Pricing Under Social Utility with Constant Relative 
Strength 
We now calculate the indifference pricing in the presence of social utility function. The 
indifference equation is given by 
Ð-Ñm, Ò,, Ò;2  ×jÐ-Ñm  S  A-.1, .2, .3, 0, .02, Ò,, Ò;2k, (6.3) 
where S is the price paid for the bond, and A-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12 is the payout of the bond. 
Using the utility function given in (6.2), we get 
S-0, .0, Ò,, Ò;2  ,ÓG ln,g -ÓG ÓH2⁄ XGî -,DXH.1.2.32XG.1,.2,.3,0,.0  . (6.4) 
Comparing (6.4) with (2.2) we see that the addition of social utility inserts an extra factor 
of  -Ò, Ò;2⁄ CÓGY -×CDÓH-ÄGgÄHgÄI2   12 in the numerator, which becomes negligible 
as  goes to zero.  
Equation (6.4) can be written as 
S-0, .0, Ò,, Ò;2  1Ò, ln×CDÓGÚ.,0,.0 
 ln1   CÓGY Ò,Ò; 1  ×CDÓH-.1.2.32. (6.5) 
First term in equation (6.5) can be seen as the price for the financial return of the bond, 
while the second term can be interpreted as the price for the social return of the bond. For 
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Ò,  Ò;  1, and   1, the price for the social return is about 47% of the price for the 
financial return. Hence, for a 100£ paid for the financial return, investor will pay about 
47£ as charity.  
In order to see the effect of relative strength of social utility and aversion to charity on 
fair price, the price of bond is plotted against  and Ò; in the Figure 47.  
Figure 47: The left panel shows that the fair price increases with increasing A 
(relative strength of social utility), and the right panel shows that the fair price 
decreases with increasing . For small A and large  price approaches the price of 
the bond in the absence of social utility.  
The price increases logarithmically with , and decreases with Ò;. Increasing  means 
that the investor is willing to spend more money for a given expected drop in the 
reconviction rate, and hence the fair price increases. Increasing Ò; makes investor more 
averse to uncertainties in the social outcome. Hence, increasing Ò; for given uncertainty 
in the social outcome of the bond decreases the price for the bond. Therefore, we can 
interpret Ò; as investor's aversion to charity as well.  
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Figure 48: Variation of the fair price with aversion to charity (left panel) and risk 
aversion parameter (right panel) is shown. For the left panel   , and for the 
right panel   . 
Figure 48 shows the variation of fair price with aversion to charity (left panel), and risk 
aversion parameter of the investor. As expected, the price decreases monotonically with 
the charity aversion parameter. The price of the bond as a function of the risk aversion 
parameter, however, decreases initially but then changes its behavior as Ò, 9 Ò;, and 
increases afterwards. This is because as Ò, exceeds Ò;, investor becomes more averse to 
financial risk than charity, and pays more attention to the social outcome of the bond than 
its financial outcome. As a result the price moves towards the level that an investor solely 
investing for the social impact of the bond would pay. Moreover, this figure suggests that 
all else being equal, a more risk averse investor would pay higher charity than an investor 
with lower risk aversion, for certain risk and charity preferences. This is possible because 
a more risk investor  would be willing to pay more for a given change in its utility than an 
investor with a lower risk aversion, and hence could pay more for charity.  It is also clear 
from Figure 48, that for some of the curves with  9 0, the price can be minimized for a 
certain choice of risk aversion and charity aversion parameters.  
We explore this optimal point corresponding to the minimum price further in Figure 49. 
The right panel of Figure 49 shows the derivative of the price with respect to the level of 
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risk aversion parameter for different values of . This plot shows that the price is very 
sensitive to the risk aversion parameter in the region where the price decreases with 
increasing risk aversion (negative slope). However, the price’s sensitivity to risk aversion 
level does not always stay negative, and it actually becomes positive once the risk 
aversion crosses a threshold. Hence, increasing risk aversion only decreases the price to a 
certain extent. Moreover, we notice that the value of the derivative, for a given risk 
aversion, decreases with . This is consistent with our intuition that investor pays less 
attention to its risk aversion as  increases. Plot in the left panel of Figure 49 shows the 
optimal risk aversion (Ò,) with the charity aversion parameter (Ò;) for three different 
level of . We see that the optimal risk aversion increases with the charity aversion 
parameter. Hence, an investor with a higher level of charity aversion could decrease its 
price by further increasing its financial risk aversion. In addition, the curves move 
downward with increasing . This is because an investor with higher  would be willing 
to spend more on charity for given risk preferences, and hence would quickly lose its 
ability to reduce its price by increasing its risk aversion. 
  
Figure 49: Variation of the optimal risk aversion parameter with the charity 
aversion parameter for different values of   is shown in the left panel. The right 
panel shows the derivative of the fair price with the risk aversion parameter. 
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Figure 50: The left panel shows the constant price curves for different prices and 
same A, and the right panel shows the constant price curves for different A and the 
same price. 
Figure 50 shows the set of Ò,, Ò; values that lead to the same price. The negative slope of 
the curves at all points indicates that an increase in one parameter would require a 
decrease in the other parameter to keep the price at the same level. In other words, if an 
investor becomes more risk averse, she would pay the same price for the bond if her 
aversion to charity decreases. Curves move downward with increasing price as the 
investor needs to be less charity averse to pay the higher price for the same level of risk 
aversion. Similarly, increasing  shifts curves upward as an investor with higher  
derives higher utility from the social impact of the bond and would be willing to pay a 
higher price even for relatively higher aversion to charity than the investor with lower . 
In the left panel of Figure 50, we see an interesting behavior in terms of the convexity of 
the curves. For small values of  the financial risk aversion parameter, the convexity is 
negative. This implies that an investor with a higher level of risk aversion would be 
willing to become more charitable to increase her risk aversion by one unit, as compared 
to an investor with a lower risk aversion. That is, investor values her risk aversion more 
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as her risk aversion increases. However, this behavior changes for larger values of the 
risk aversion parameter. As convexity becomes positive, investor values her risk aversion 
less, and becomes willing to trade off one unit of risk aversion for a lower amount of 
charity aversion.  
At this point, investors with different levels of risk and charity aversion parameters that 
lie on a constant price curve are indistinguishable from each other. However, these 
investors would likely respond differently to changes in the notional and the cap rate of 
the bond. For a fixed expected payout of the bond, an investor with a lower level of 
aversion to charity is likely to pay a higher price for the bond that has a higher cap rate 
and lower notional, as compared to a bond that has a higher notional and lower cap rate. 
This is because, a bond with a higher cap rate would pay more when the reconviction rate 
drops by a higher amount, and the higher drop in reconviction rate would make a socially 
responsible investor pay more for the bond. Therefore, the investor’s social utility can be 
useful in determining the optimal choice for the notional and the cap rate for the bond. 
We will further explore this point in the next section, when we price the bond from the 
issuer’s perspective, and aim to find the optimal choice for the bond parameters. 
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Chapter 7  
7. The Fair Price of the SIB From the Issuer’s Perspective 
In this section, we calculate the bond price from the issuer’s perspective, and study the 
effects of the issuer’s budget constraints, risk aversion, and its propensity to do social 
welfare on the bond price. When pricing from the issuer’s perspective, we consider the 
bond’s notional (0) and the cap rate (.1) to be variable, as the values of these parameters 
are chosen by the issuer. For a given choice of issuer’s utility parameters, and budget 
constraints, we then obtain a set of 0 and .1 values that make the bond a feasible 
investment for both the issuer and the investor. This also allows us to identify the optimal 
values of 0 and .1 such that the issuer’s risk adjusted profit is maximized within its 
budget constraints.  
7.1. Risk Adjusted Price for the Issuer 
We start by modeling the issuer’s risk aversion with the exponential utility. Specifically 
Ð-Ñ , Ò2  D,Ó -CDÓ Y  12 , (7.1) 
where Ð-Ñ, Ò2, is the issuer’s utility, Ò is the issuer’s risk aversion, and Ñ is the 
wealth of the issuer. 
Now we compare the issuer’s utility of funding the Peterborough Prison rehabilitation 
program with its utility to fund the cost of keeping prisoners incarcerated without any 
rehabilitation program. Without the rehab program, the government6 would have to pay 
the cost of keeping prisoners incarcerated, while upon funding the rehab program, the 
government has to pay the bond’s payout, but it saves the amount spent on keeping 
                                                 
6
 The bond is issued by the Social Finance, a financial intermediary, and the payout is made by the UK’s 
Ministry of Justice, and the Big Lottery Fund. But, in this section, we make no distinction between the 
issuer of the bond and the UK government.   
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prisoners in prison if the recidivism rate drops. Hence, we calculate the fair price of the 
bond as the minimum price that government needs to charge for the bond in order to 
equate its expected utility of funding the rehab program to its utility of funding the cost of 
prison without the rehab program. This leads to 
Ð-Ñ  +-m22  ×jÐÑ  S  +-2  A-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12k , (7.2) 
where +-m2 is the cost of keeping prisoners in prison per bondholder when the 
recidivism rate is m, and +-2 is the cost of keeping in prisoners in prison per 
bondholder when the recidivism rate is , S is the minimum price the issuer is willing to 
accept for the bond, and A-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12 is the bond’s payout.  
We define the government’s savings from issuing the bond as 
È-.,, .;, .<2   +-m2  +-2, (7.3) 
where .,, .;, .<, are the drops in reconviction rate for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cohorts, 
respectively. 
This leads to the following form for the price 
S-0, .1 , Ò2  ,Ó ln -ô CÓ-Ú-ÄG,ÄH,ÄI,1,Äì2D-ÄG,ÄH,ÄI22V-.,, .;, .<, 2,D, n.,n.;n.<2, (7.4) 
where V-.,, .;, .<, 2 is the joint probability density function for the change in 
reconviction rate in the three cohorts of the Peterborough Prison, and  is the set of 
distribution parameters.  
We now introduce another parameter , which denotes the cost of keeping one prisoner in 
prison for one year divided by the total number of bonds sold. The parameter  therefore 
represents the amount that government saves per bondholder if one prisoner does not go 
back to prison. Hence, the government’s savings can be written as 
È-.,, .;, .<2   +-m2  +-2   è -.,  .;  .<2. (7.5) 
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Depending on the relative values of  and 0, government’s price can be either positive or 
negative. If  9 0, government’s price is likely to be negative as it saves more money per 
prisoner than it pays to the bondholders. By default, we take   0  0.01£.  
  
Figure 51: The left panel shows the risk adjusted price for !"  %, and the right 
panel shows the price for "  . £. Both panels have $  . £, %  . , and &  . 
Plots of the issuer’s price versus notional amount (left panel) and cap rate (right panel) 
are shown in Figure 51. These plots indicate that for 0  0£ the government saves 
approximately 2£ per bondholder, if it funds the rehab program, and that the 
government’s savings exceed its risk adjusted cost for 0 : 0.012£, if the cap rate is fixed 
at 13%. Notice, however, that 0  0£  corresponds to the scenario where the government 
funds the rehabilitation program on its own without issuing any bond. Expected profit at 0  0£ is, therefore, the profit that the government can earn without issuing any bond. 
Moreover, for 0    0.01£, the issuer’s savings exceed the risk adjusted payout for all .1 : 30%. Thus if the government chooses to pay a notional of 0.01£ per prisoner, it can 
increase its cap rate to 30% before it depletes its savings. The difference between the 
black curve (buyer’s price) and the red curve (issuer’s price) can be considered the 
issuer’s risk adjusted profit. The region where red curve is below the black curve is the 
profitable region for the issuer, because the minimum price issuer is willing to receive for 
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the bond lies below the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay. To maximize its 
profit, issuer would want to choose 0 and .1 where its profit is the largest. 
7.2. Risk Adjusted Price Under Budget Constraints 
Our utility analysis assumes that government would be willing to issue the social impact 
bond irrespective of the price buyers pay for it. But that is not the case. As indicated in 
the introductory section of this report, part of the SIB’s appeal to the government is that it 
saves the government from paying the money upfront, and the government cannot always 
fund such rehab programs due to budgetary constraints. Therefore, it would only be 
willing to issue the bond if it can raise enough money from buyers to cover a significant 
portion of the upfront cost of the rehab program.  
We include this budgetary constraint by introducing a new parameter S in our model, 
which refers to the minimum amount the government needs to raise from a bondholder in 
order to fund the rehab program. So if the price that the buyer is willing to pay for the 
bond is less than the minimum amount needed to be raised to fund the program (S), then 
the project will not be initiated. Here we also assume that the number of bonds sold is 
independent of the price charged. This is a reasonable assumption because the price 
charged never exceeds the maximum price that buyer is willing to pay for the bond, and 
hence, the buyer should be mostly indifferent between different prices. If the bond price 
increases that is because the risk adjusted payout of the bond increases, and not because 
the buyer lowers her risk aversion. In other words, the buyer pays more for a higher 
expected payout and not for the same payout. 
To take into account this budget constraint, we modify the price function to 
S-0, .1 , Ò2  s S; If SÚ : S  S-0, .1 , Ò2;  If SÚ 9 S R, (7.6) 
where S is the minimum amount per bondholder that the government needs to raise in 
order to fund the rehabilitation program. 
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This makes the price function discontinuous, and puts a lower limit on 0 and .1. If the 
government selects 0 and .1 that are too small, buyers will not be willing to pay enough 
for the bond to cover the minimum funding cost required to fund the rehab program.  
Figure 52: The left panel shows the issuer’s price with the notional (") for !" %. The right panel shows the issuer’s price with the cap rate (!") for "  . '. 
For both panels, $  . £, ()  £,  %  . , and &  . 
The price function is plotted in Figure 52. In the presence of minimum funding cost (S), 
the issuer’s profitability region shrinks. Hence, the higher the minimum amount that the 
government wants to raise from the investor (S), the narrower the profitability region.  
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Figure 53: Plots in the upper panel show the surface plots of the buyer and issuer 
price, while surface plot in the lower left panel shows issuer’s profit and the contour 
plot in the lower right panel shows the region where profit exceeds zero. All plots 
have been obtained for $  . £, (  £,  %  . , and &  . All plots have 
the same x,y, and z axes. 
Figure 53 shows the surface plots of the buyer and the issuer prices with 0 and .1. 
Looking at the contour plot in the lower right panel of Figure 53, we notice that the width 
of the profitability region shrinks as we increase the notional (0). Moreover, the region 
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also shifts leftward along the cap rate (.1) axis. This is because increasing the notional 
amount increases the bond’s payout, which increases both the buyer’s and the issuer’s 
price for a given .1. An increase in the buyer’s price shifts the lower limit of the 
profitability band backward because the minimum funding cost can be raised at lower .1.  
Similarly, increase in issuer’s price for a given .1, shifts the upper end of the profitability 
band backward as the issuer’s price exceeds the buyer’s price for smaller .1. Somewhere 
within this region lies the optimal choice of 0 and.1 that maximizes the issuer’s profit.  
7.3. Effect of Social Welfare Spending on the Fair Price 
Before we try to find the optimal choice of parameters, we take into account the effect of 
the issuer raising more than the bare minimum cost of the program. We can expect that 
with the higher upfront funding, the issuer would be able to invest more in the 
rehabilitation program and achieve better outcomes. Therefore, if the price that the buyer 
pays for the bond exceeds the minimum amount needed to fund the program, the 
probability distribution for the outcome of the rehabilitation program will move forward. 
That is, we expect the position parameter to move forward by 
∆\  È-SÚ  S2, (7.7) 
where È is the drop in recidivism rate that can be achieved by an additional unit of initial 
funding. We will assume that the È is constant, and by default we will take È  0.1. That 
is, we expect one additional unit of upfront funding to reduce recidivism rate by an 
additional 10%. This is reasonable because we have taken the minimum cost to fund the 
program to be 1£ and it is expected to decrease the recidivism rate by 10% from its 
normal level.  
Moreover, we assume that the government would be willing to spend extra money for 
social welfare if it can achieve higher reduction in recidivism rate. Therefore, we add 
another term to the issuer’s utility function, which increases when SÚ exceeds S. We 
model this with an exponential utility function, and we write the change in issuer’s social 
utility as 
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∆Ð-Ò2  7-SÚ  S 9 02 AÒ 1  CDÓ -D 2 ,  (7.8) 
where Ò is the issuer’s aversion to social welfare, and A is the amount issuer is willing to 
spend for social welfare for a given decrease in recidivism rate, 7-. 2 is the indicator 
function. 
The price function then becomes 
S-0, .1 , Ò , Ò2  1Ò ln×ÒA-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12  È-.,, .;, .<2
 1Ò ln !1  7-SÚ  S 9 02A ÒÒ 1  CDÓ  -D 2". (7.9) 
 
  
Figure 54: The left panel shows the issuer’s price with the notional amount, and the 
right panel shows issuer’s price with the cap rate. Total price is represented by the 
yellow curve. For both panels: %  . , *  . , &  , *  . , and &  . 
Figure 54 shows the variation of the price with respect to the bond’s notional (left panel) 
and cap rate (right panel). Here we see that the red curve, which represents the issuer’s 
price for risk, bends downward as SÚ exceeds S. This is a result of making the 
87 
 
probability distribution for the outcome of the rehab program a function of the buyer’s 
price. As the buyer’s price exceeds the minimum funding cost (S), the rehab program 
can deliver better results, which result in higher savings for the government. The green 
curve represents the effect of the social welfare spending of the government. As the 
expected drop in the reconviction rate increases (due to higher upfront money raised), the 
government’s willingness to subsidize the bond increases, and results in a lower price that 
the government is willing to accept for the bond. The yellow curve is the total price that 
the government is willing to receive for the bond. Once SÚ exceeds S, the yellow curve 
is simply the sum of the red curve and the green curve. The region where the yellow 
curve lies below the black curve is the profitable region for the issuer, and the presence of 
the green curve increases this region.   
Figure 55 shows surface plots of the buyer’s and the issuer’s price (upper left and right 
panels), and surface and contour plots for the issuer’s profit (lower left and right panels). 
Comparing the plots of Figure 55 with the plots of Figure 53, we notice little difference. 
This is because for small values of A and È, the effect on the  prices and the issuer’s 
profit is relatively small. The most important effect of the non-zero values of A and È is 
on the optimal values for the bond’s notional and cap rate that maximize the issuer’s 
profit. If A and È are both zero, the optimal parameters are always the ones that make the 
buyer’s price equal to the minimum funding cost required to fund the program. However, 
non-zero values for A and È, even if small, can change the optimal parameters. 
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Figure 55: The upper left and right panels show surface plots of the buyer’s price 
and the issuer’s price with the bond’s notional and cap rate, respectively. The lower 
left and right panels show surface and contour plots of the issuer’s profit, 
respectively. For all panels: %  . , *  . , &  , *  . , and &  . All 
plots have the same x,y, and z axes.   
 
7.4. The Optimal Bond Parameters 
Now we look at how the optimal bond parameters vary with the issuer’s willingness to 
subsidize a higher reduction in recidivism rate. We first calculate the optimal parameters 
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for a given value of A, and then calculate the buyer’s price at those parameters. The left 
panel of Figure 56 shows the buyer’s price evaluated at the optimal parameters as a 
function of issuer’s subsidy, and the right panel shows the net buyer’s price (buyer’s 
price less issuer’s subsidy) as a function of issuer’s subsidy. We see that the buyer’s price 
increases with the issuer’s subsidy, however, the net buyer’s price starts decreasing after 
the issuer’s subsidy exceeds a certain limit. This provides one way for the issuer to 
choose the optimal subsidy such that it maximizes the net money raised from the buyers. 
Figure 56: The left panel shows the buyer’s price with the issuer’s welfare spending, 
and the right panel shows the buyer’s price less the issuer’s subsidy.  
Figure 57 shows the effect of government’s welfare spending on the government’s 
optimal profit. The left panel plots the government’s profit with its welfare spending, and 
the right panel shows the government’s profit per unit welfare spending. It is clear from 
the figure that while the government can increase its net profit (profit less welfare 
spending) by increasing its welfare spending, its profit per unit welfare spending 
decreases. The issuer profit increases with the welfare spending because the higher 
welfare spending increases the bond’s notional and/or cap rate, which increases the 
buyer’s price and the expected savings. Therefore, for small amounts of welfare 
spending, the government can extract more money from the buyers and the savings than 
it spends on welfare. Hence, the net profit increases.  
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Figure 57: The issuer’s profit (left panel) and the issuer’s profit per unit welfare 
spending (right panel) is shown. 
Now, we look at how the optimal parameters and the optimal profit vary with the buyer’s 
risk and charity aversion parameters. We consider a set of buyers with different risk and 
charity aversion such that they pay the same price for the bond with 0  0.01£, and .1  13%. Next, we calculate the optimal parameters for each one of these buyers, and 
then calculate the issuer’s profit at these optimal parameters. This profit represents the 
maximum profit that the issuer can earn from a buyer with the given risk preferences. In 
order to calculate the optimal net profit, we subtract the subsidy paid by the issuer from 
the issuer’s total profit.   
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Figure 58: Relationship between the investor’s risk and charity aversion parameter 
(left panel) and the optimal welfare spending for a given choice of choice of risk 
preference (right panel) is shown. 
The left panel of Figure 58 shows the set of investors that pay the same price for the bond 
issued with the reference parameters. Each point on this curve represents an investor with 
a different choice of risk preferences. We can see from the plot that as the investor 
becomes more averse to charity, its risk aversion decreases to keep the price constant. 
The right panel of Figure 58 shows the optimal welfare spending for each investor. We 
see that the optimal welfare spending decreases as the aversion to charity increases. That 
is, an investor with higher aversion to charity would optimize the profit when the 
government spends greater amount on the welfare spending. 
7.4.1. Optimal Bond Parameters for Buyers with Different Risk 
Preferences  
Next, we look at the dependence of the optimal profit on the government’s welfare 
spending for the set of investors shown in Figure 58. Figure 59 shows the optimal 
parameters (left panel) and the corresponding net profit (right panel) with the 
government’s welfare spending. We see from Figure 59 that the optimal profit initially 
decreases with welfare spending but then starts to increase again. The red curve in the 
right panel of Figure 59 shows the profit that the government earns at the reference 
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parameters (0  0.01£, and .1  13%). The optimal parameter touches the reference 
profit for a subsidy of about 0.5£, and is always bigger than the reference profit for other 
values of welfare spending.  
 
 
Figure 59: Variation of the optimal parameters (left panel) and the issuer’s optimal 
profit (right panel) is shown with the welfare spending. 
The point where the red curve intersects with the green curve corresponds to the investor 
for whom the optimal parameters are the reference parameters. This is the investor that 
the issuer should aim to target if it issues the bond with the reference parameter. 
However, targeting this investor is not advisable because all investors, including the ones 
that could lead to higher profit for other choices of the bond parameters, would pay the 
same price at the reference parameters, and the government would be earning suboptimal 
profit. If the government sets the optimal parameters different from the reference 
parameters, then the optimal buyer would be the one that pays the highest price, and other 
buyers would simply not buy the bond. This will allow the issuer to earn the maximum 
profit. Moreover, this curve implies that the issuer can achieve the same level of 
profitability with at two different levels of welfare spending. This higher profit earned at 
different choices of the bond parameters is a consequence of utilizing the information that 
the buyers pay the same price at the reference parameters. This, however, comes with a 
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risk. The issuer is taking the risk that the investors would maintain their risk preferences 
even if the bond’s payout changes, and would be willing to transact, and buy the same 
number of bonds. The farther away the issuer moves from the reference parameters, the 
higher these risks, and the higher the profit opportunity. Hence, the additional profit that 
the government can earn by targeting buyers with optimal parameters different from the 
reference parameters can be seen as a reward for the risk that the government is taking 
based on the information of price that the buyers paid at the reference parameters. 
However, the government can only take advantage of this information in its future 
projects, as it would not have the price information before the issuance of the first bond. 
Therefore, the issuer can use this model to learn more and more about the buyers' 
preferences from the repeated issuances of the bond and maximize its total profit over the 
total bond issuances.  
Figure 60: Net price paid by the buyer (left panel) and the decomposition of the 
issuer’s profit (right panel) are shown. 
In order to determine which level of welfare spending (and the corresponding bond 
parameters) the issuer should choose, we first look at the variation of the buyer’s price 
(left panel of Figure 60) and the sources of the issuer’s profit (right panel of Figure 60). 
The red curve in the left panel represents the price that the buyer is willing to pay at the 
reference parameters (0  0.01£, and .1  13%). Unlike the issuer’s profit, which is 
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always bigger than reference profit, the buyer’s price is lower than the reference price 
when the welfare spending is lower than 0.5£, and increases with the welfare spending. 
Note that the government’s welfare spending has been subtracted from the buyer’s price 
in Figure 59 to yield the price that buyer is paying after compensating for the 
government’s subsidy. This plot helps us understand the sources of the issuer’s profit 
(shown in the right panel). For small subsidies the net profit comes almost exclusively 
from the issuer’s savings. However, the relative significance of the savings drops as the 
welfare spending increases, and the significance of the buyer’s price increases.  
Figure 61 further clarifies this trend by plotting the contributions of the buyer’s price and 
the issuer’s savings to the issuer’s net profit. Issuer’s savings remain dominant, however, 
their relative contribution to the profit decreases. Therefore, if the issuer prefers savings 
over the upfront cash raised from buyers then it should lower its welfare spending. On the 
other hand, if the issuer prefers the upfront cash more than the savings, then it should 
increase its welfare spending. The right panel of Figure 61 shows the issuer’s profit 
margin (net profit per unit welfare spending), and it decreases exponentially. Therefore, 
while the issuer can increase its profit by increasing its welfare spending, its profit 
margin decreases with the welfare spending. This suggests that for a given level of profit, 
the issuer should choose the lowest welfare spending to maximize its profit margin. 
However, as shown in the left panel of Figure 61, for lower welfare spending, most of the 
issuer’s profit comes from the savings, which reduces the government’s ability achieve 
better social outcomes due to lower cash raised.  
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Figure 61: Contributions of the issuer’s savings and buyer’s price to the issuer’s 
profit (left panel) and the issuer’s profit margin (right panel) is shown. 
 
Figure 62: Social Impact of the bond (left panel) and the total impact of the bond 
(right panel) are shown. 
Therefore, in order to get a complete picture, we look at the variation of the social impact 
(as measured by the expected drop in recidivism rate) of the bond with the issuer’s 
welfare spending. In order to estimate the bond’s social impact, we use equation (7.7), 
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where we assume that the average drop in reconviction rate is proportional to the amount 
raised from the buyers above the minimum funding cost required for the rehab program. 
Hence, the social impact of the bond increases with the welfare spending, due to the 
rising buyer’s price. We multiply the issuer’s profit margin with the social impact of the 
bond in the right panel of Figure 61 to obtain a measure for the total impact of the bond. 
This plot shows that the same level of total impact can be achieved with two different 
levels of welfare spending. Lower welfare spending achieves higher total impact by 
increasing the profit margin, while the higher welfare spending increases the total impact 
by increasing the social impact of the bond. Moreover, since the different levels of 
welfare spending optimize profits for different types of investors, the issuer would 
essentially be choosing one of the two target investors by setting a level of welfare 
spending, to achieve a given level of total impact. And the higher the impact that the 
issuer wants to achieve, the higher would be the difference between the nature of 
investors. Therefore, to maximize the impact of the bond, the issuer would have to target 
either the investors with a relatively high risk aversion and very small (negative) charity 
aversion, or the investors with a relatively low risk aversion and a very high charity 
aversion. The investors in the middle with medium risk aversion and medium charity 
aversion would lead to the smallest impact. 
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Chapter 8  
8. Summary and Future Work 
In this thesis, we have analyzed the social impact bond from the perspective of the buyer 
and the issuer. For the buyer, we have studied the combined effect of the buyer’s aversion 
to risk and ambiguity, and the buyer’s aversion to risk and charity. We have presented 
two pricing mechanisms with two different probability distribution functions for the 
underlying random variable, and examined the effect of these choices on the fair price 
and the sensitivity of the fair price to key variables. Our analysis has also shown that the 
interplay of the investor’s risk and charity preferences yields some interesting results. A 
buyer with a higher risk aversion may be willing to pay a higher price for the bond, and 
buyers with very different risk and charity preferences may pay the same price for the 
bond.  
For the issuer, we have limited ourselves to the combined effect of the issuer’s aversion 
to risk and social welfare. However, even this simple analysis helps us gain some useful 
insights about how the issuer can adjust the bond’s parameters to achieve a required level 
of impact. We see that the issuer can increase its financial profit by targeting buyers with 
relatively lower aversion to risk, and it can increase the social impact of the bond by 
targeting buyers with relatively lower aversion to charity. In addition, we can conclude 
that the issuer should choose small values for notional and cap rate of the bond to target 
investors with relatively lower aversion to charity, and the issuer should choose higher 
notional and lower cap rate to target investors with relatively low aversion to financial 
risk. Issuer can use this model to learn about buyers' preferences and optimize the bond 
for specific buyers in each subsequent issuance, and maximize its total profit over all the 
bond issuances. 
We could further extend this work by taking into account all three sources of uncertainty 
– financial risk, soical risk, and ambiguity – at once, for both the buyer and the issuer, 
and determine optimal bond parameters. In addition, here we have limited ourselves to 
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calculating the fair price for the buyer and the expected profit for the issuer. In future, this 
can be further extended to include value at risk models that allow the buyer and the issuer 
to do a more sophisticated risk and return analysis and adjust the bond’s notional and cap 
rate accordingly. The assumption that the bond’s payout structure is fixed can also be 
relaxed. And the effect of the changes in the bond’s payout structure can be studied from 
the perspective of both the issuer and the buyer, to find the payout structure that 
maximizes the bond’s total impact for the society. 
Moreover, we have only considered how the social and financial returns of the bond may 
appeal different buyers with different risk and charity preferences differently, and how 
that may affect the fair bond price. This can be further extended by looking at the 
correlations of the social impact bond with different asset classes to incorporate 
diversification benefits of the social impact bonds. The fair bond price then will not only 
depend on the social and financial returns of the bond but also on its diversification 
benefits.  
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Appendix 1: Rehabilitation Program Data  
Bins -#2 Average weight of a program in the 
bin -$#2 Frequency-#2 
Weighted frequency  
(#  # $#/∑ $#'#| ) 
-10% 0% 0 0 
-5% 0% 0 0 
-2.50% 17% 1 1.258122744 
0% 18% 6 7.844765343 
7.50% 12% 13 11.39711191 
12.50% 13% 11 10.87906137 
17.50% 18% 6 8.140794224 
22.50% 3% 2 0.493381468 
27.50% 0% 0 0 
32.50% 5% 1 0.370036101 
50% 0% 0 0 
70% 5% 1 0.370036101 
100% 0% 0 0 
Table 5: Bins and weighted frequency. 
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Type Weight 
Education and Training 12% 
Housing 40% 
Cognitive 5% 
Addiction 17% 
Table 6: Weights assigned to rehab services offered to Peterborough Prisoners. 
 
Program Type of Program 
Drop in 
Reconviction Rate 
Overlap 
Key-Crest Program 
(Key only) (Gaes, 
1999) 
Drug-Addiction -3.0% 17% 
Straight Thinking On 
Probation (STOP) - 
24 month follow up 
(Raynor, 1996) 
Cognitive Skills -2.0% 5% 
Behavioral Change 
Program (Part of 
Final Warning 
Scheme) (Hine, 
2001) 
Cognitive Skills 0.0% 5% 
The Intensive after 
care program  
(Griffiths, 2007) 
Integrated  0.0% 12% 
The Harlem Parole 
Reentry Court 
(Griffiths, 2007) 
Integrated  0.0% 17% 
Project Greenlight 
(Griffiths, 2007) 
Integrated  0.0% 57% 
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Prison Labor and 
Prison (Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
0.0% 12% 
The Thinking Skills 
Program (Gaes, 
1999) 
Cognitive Skills 2.0% 5% 
Summary of 
Vocational Training 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
3.5% 12% 
Summary of 
Vocational 
Programs - less than 
100 hours (Gaes, 
1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
4.1% 12% 
Summary of 
Vocational 
Programs - more 
than 300 hours 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
4.5% 12% 
CDATE - average 
drop in adult 
reconviction (Gaes, 
1999) 
Cognitive Skills 5.0% 5% 
Cognitive Thinking 
Skills Program(using 
largest scale of 
evaluation to date) 
Canada (Gaes, 
1999) 
Cognitive Skills 5.1% 0% 
Prison Education 
and Prison Behavior 
(Adult Basic 
Education ABE - 
dropped out group) 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
5.4% 0% 
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Maryland Reentry 
partnership (REP) 
(House of Commons 
Home Affairs 
Committee, 2010) 
Integrated  5.6% 0% 
Straight Thinking On 
Probation (STOP) - 
12 month follow up 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Cognitive Skills 7.0% 5% 
Summary of 
Academic programs 
- fewer than 100 
hours (Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
7.0% 12% 
Cognitive Skill 
Courses (Gaes, 
1999) 
Cognitive Skills 8.0% 74% 
Summary of 
Academic programs 
- more than 300 
hours (Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
8.4% 5% 
New Vision Program 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Drug-Addiction 9.0% 12% 
Cognitive Thinking 
Skills Program (Pilot 
in Correctional 
Services Canada) 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Cognitive Skills 10.4% 5% 
Key-Crest(Crest 
Only) (Gaes, 1999) 
Cognitive Skills 11.0% 12% 
Rehabilitation for 
Addicted Prisoenrs 
Trust (RAPt) 
program (House of 
Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 
Drug-Addiction 11.0% 17% 
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2010) 
Prison Education 
and Prison Behavior 
(Adult Basic 
Education ABE - 
group who 
completed) (Gaes, 
1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
11.5% 5% 
Residential 
Treatment in 
Bureau of Prisons 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Drug-Addiction 11.9% 5% 
The Prolific and 
Other Priority 
Offender Program 
PPO (U.K) (Griffiths, 
2007) 
Integrated  12.0% 17% 
Specialized Drug 
Offender Program 
(SDOP non-
cognitive group) 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Drug-Addiction 12.3% 0% 
ASSET (Samo, 
Hearnden, & 
Hedderman) 
Employment and 
Education 
13.0% 12% 
Circles of Support 
and Accountability 
(Griffiths, 2007) 
Integrated  15.1% 17% 
Amity Right Turn 
Project (Gaes, 1999) 
Integrated  15.8% 40% 
Prison Labor and 
Prison Behavior 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Employment and 
Education 
16.0% 17% 
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Specialized Drug 
Offender Program 
(SDOP) - Cognitive 
group only (Gaes, 
1999) 
Drug-Addiction 16.20% 12% 
R & R program 
(Gaes, 1999) 
Cognitive Skills 19.0% 52% 
Life Skills group, 
Cognitive Thinking 
Skills Program 
(Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation) 
Canada (Gaes, 
1999) 
Cognitive Skills 22.0% 17% 
Key-Crest(Key-Crest 
group) (Gaes, 1999) 
Cognitive Skills 31.0% 12% 
Cognitive Skills 
Group, Cognitive 
Thinking Skills 
Program(Reasoning 
& Rehabilitation) 
Canada (Gaes, 
1999) 
Cognitive Skills 51.40% 17% 
Table 7: Historical data for the rehabilitation programs from around the world. 
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Appendix 2: Method of Moments 
For the skew-normal distribution, mean, variance, and skewness are 
LMM
N
MMO (CQË   \  );* ñ«√,g«HÌQK}QËC  ];-1  ;* «H,g«H2 
,0CÑËC,,  =D*; -)H- .G/.H2I-,DH- .HG/.H2I/H
R, 
 
(A2.1) 
These equations can be inverted to calculate \, ], [ for the skew-normal distribution. This 
leads to 
LM
MM
N
MM
MO||  0*; |ÓI|HI|ÓI|HIg_1-H `HI
Ý [p  f√,DfH]p;  ÓH ,DH- .HG/.H\̂  Ò,  );* «ñ,g«H
R, 
 
(A2.2) 
where Ò,, Ò;, Ò< are the sample mean, variance, and skewness respectively, and   «,g«H .  
For the beta distribution, first two moments are 
 
LMN
MO×jZk  eDf;ef j1  2-23-1,1  , 2  , 12  2-23-1,1  , 2  , 12×jZ;k  ,= -  ;    ;  22j2-23-1,1  , 3  , 12k ;gfgege-,ge24-;gf25-,,,De,<gf,D,2f-,gf2e-,ge2
R, (A2.3) 
where 2-. 2 is the Gamma function, and 3-. , . , . , . 2 is the Hypergeometric function. 
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Appendix 3: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation 
The likelihood functions for the skew normal distribution is 
wW1XY-[, \, ]2 3 ∏ VW1XY-Zy2z-y2{y|, , (A3.1) 
where VW1XY is the probability density function of the skew-normal distribution and V-}2 
is the weighted frequency for the }c~ bin (given in Table 1 of Appendix 1).  
Similarly, the maximum likelihood function for the beta distribution is 
wbXcd-, 2 3 ∏ VbXcd-Zy2z-y2{y|, , (A3.2) 
where VbXcd is the probability density function of the beta distribution and V-}2 is the 
weighted frequency for the }c~ bin (given in Table 1 of Appendix 1). 
The most likely parameters are then obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
with respect to the distribution parameters. 
For the skew-normal distribution, we get the following system of equations 
LMM
N
MMO
6lnwW1XY-[, \, ]26[  06lnwW1XY-[, \, ]26\  06lnwW1XY-[, \, ]26]  0
R (A3.3) 
Ý
LMM
MN
MMM
O· V-}2VW1XY-Zy26VW1XY-Zy26[
{
y|,  0
· V-}2VW1XY-Zy26VW1XY-Zy26\
{
y|,  0
· V-}2VW1XY-Zy26VW1XY-Zy26]
{
y|,  0
R (A3.4) 
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Ý
LM
MM
N
MM
MO · V-}2-Zy  \2] ^-[
Zy  \] 2a-[ Zy  \] 2
{
y|,  0
· V-}2j^ _[ Zy  \] `^ _[ Zy  \] `  [
^-[ Zy  \] 2a-[ Zy  \] 2k
{
y|,  0
· V-}2j[ _Zy  \] ` ^ _[
Zy  \] `a _[ Zy  \] `  _
Zy  \] ` ^
 _[ Zy  \] `^ _[ Zy  \] `  1k
{
y|,  0
R (A3.5) 
 
Similarly, for the beta distribution the system of equations is  
LMN
MO6lnwbXcd-, 26  06lnwbXcd-, 26  0
R (A3.6) 
Ý
LM
N
MO· V-}2-ln-1  Zy2  ln-22  6A-, 2/6A-, 2 2{y|,  0
· V-}2-ln-1  Zy2  ln-22  6A-, 2/6A-, 2 2{y|,  0
R (A3.7) 
Where A-, 2 is the Beta function defined in equation (2.3).   
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Appendix 4: Notation 
Description of the Variable Symbol 
Observed, and predictive dataset for the drop in recidivism rate , 7 
Drop in the reconviction rate of the 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3
rd
 cohorts respectively .,,.;,.< 
Average drop in the reconviction rate among the three cohorts . 
Notional per prisoner for the bond 0 
Cap rate for the bond .1 
Total number of bonds held by an investor 4 
The risk free interest rate K 
Time of payment for the 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3
rd
 coupons respectively J,,J;,J< 
The bond’s yield to maturity T 
The fair price of the bond under the Wang and utility pricing mechanism, 
respectively 
Ê, S 
Skewness, position, and scale parameters for the skew normal distribution [, \, ] 
The beta distribution parameters ,  
Method of Moments estimates for the skew normal distribution parameters [p, \̂, ]p 
Method of Moments estimates for the beta distribution parameters p, v 
Maximum likelihood estimates for the skew normal distribution parameters [, \, ] 
Maximum likelihood estimate for the beta distribution parameters ,  
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Reference parameters for the skew normal distribution  [, \, ] 
Maximum likelihood estimate for the beta distribution parameters ,  
Set of distribution parameters for a general distribution  
Risk aversion parameter for the Wang transfrom Î 
Risk aversion parameter for the utility formulation Ò 
Initial wealth of the investor Ñ 
Ambiguity aversion parameter µ 
Investor’s aversion to charity Ò; 
Risk aversion parameter for the issuer Ò 
Aversion to social welfare parameter for the issuer Ò 
Initial wealth of the issuer Ñ 
The cost per bondholder of keeping one prisoner in prison for one year   
Minimum funding required to fund the rehabilitation program S 
The fair price of the bond for the issuer S 
Current recidivism rate for the Peterborough Prisoners m 
Recidivism rate of the Peterborough Prisoners after the rehab program  
Buyer’s price received by the issuer SÚ 
Table 8: Description of all the variables used and associated symbols is presented 
here. 
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Description of the Function Symbol 
Payout for the i
th coupon +y-.y, 0, .12; }  1,2,3 
Payout for the 4
th
 coupon +=-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12 
Payout for the bond A-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12 
Probability density function for the skew normal VW1XY-., [, \, ] 2 
Probability density function for the beta distribution VbXcd-., ,  2 
Reference probability density function for the skew normal VW1XY-., [, \, ] 2 
Probability density function for the beta distribution VbXcd-., ,  2 
The Beta function h-,  2 
Maximum likelihood function for the skew normal 
distribution 
wW1XY-[, \, ]2 
Maximum likelihood function for the beta normal 
distribution 
wbXcd-, 2 
The Wang adjusted cumulative distribution function 
Í., , Î 
The Wang adjusted probability distribution function VÍ., , Î 
Cumulative distribution function for the skew normal 
distribution 

W1XY-., [, \, ]2 
Cumulative distribution function for the beta distribution 
bXcd-., , 2 
The Incomplete Beta function h-., ,  2 
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The fair price for the i
th
 coupon under the Wang transform Êy-.y , 0, .12; }  1,2,3 
The fair price for the 4
th
 coupon under the Wang transform Ê=-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12 
The fair price for the bond under the Wang Transform Ê-.,, .;, .<, 0, .12 
Financial utility function for the investor Ð,-Ñ, Ò,2 
Penalty function for the ambiguity aversion Þ-ßà|ß2 
Ambiguity adjusted CDF and PDF for the skew normal, 
respectively 

8-., [, \, ], Î2, V8-., [, \, ], Î2 
Ambiguity adjusted CDF and PDF for the beta, respectively 
ø-x, , , λ, θ2, Vø-x, , , λ, θ2 
Social utility function for the investor Ð;-.,, .;, .<, Ò;2 
Coefficient of the social utility for the investor -Ñ,2 
Total utility function for the investor  Ð-Ñ, Ò,, Ò;2 
The risk adjusted fair price under utility formulation S-0, .1 , Ò2 
The ambiguity adjusted fair price under utility formulation S-0, .1 , Ò, θ2 
The fair price for the bond under social utility S-0, .1 , Ò,, Ò;2 
Issuer’s utility for wealth Ð-Ñ, Ò2 
Issuer’s utility for social welfare Ð-Ñ, Ò2 
Government’s savings per bondholder  È-.,, .;, .<) 
The fair price for the issuer S-0, .1 , Ò2 
The fair price for the issuer willing to do spend for social 
welfare 
S-0, .1 , Ò , Ò2 
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Table 9: All the functions and associated notation used is shown here. 
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